GDP growth and currency valuation: The case of the dollar

One popular view on the strength of the US dollar around the turn of the century is that the higher growth in the US compared to Europe had stimulated foreigners to buy American assets, thereby driving up the exchange rate. In this paper a modified portfolio balance model is presented, in which it is shown that the impact of output growth on the exchange rate depends crucially on the origin of this growth. An improvement of the output gap is shown to actually depress the exchange rate whereas an increase in potential output growth leads to an appreciation, especially if this improvement is likely to be persistent. In an empirical example, it is shown that the equilibrium real dollar rate is indeed positively affected by high trend growth in the US, whereas it is negatively affected by a positive output gap. The model outperforms the random walk in forecasting future real dollar rates one to eight quarters ahead.     

Market Responses to Buy Recommendations Issued by Personal Finance Magazines: Effects of Information, Price-Pressure, and Company Characteristics

This paper analyzes explicit buy recommendations for stockspublished by German Personal Finance Magazines from 1995 to2003. These recommendations earn significant abnormal returnsof 2.58% within the five days around the publication day. Boththe price-pressure hypothesis and the information hypothesiscan be confirmed by our data. The price-pressure effect is mostevident for small stocks and glamour stocks. However, whereasthe initial price reaction to small stocks is additionally drivenby permanent information value, this does not hold true forglamour stocks. In contrast, value stocks are associated withhigh cumulative abnormal returns that are solely driven by informationvalue.     

Reflections on the general theory of second best at its golden jubilee

The origin of the second best article is described and criticisms assessed. Distortions making impossible the achievement of either first or second best optima are outlined. Attempts to establish the applicability of first best rules are criticised, as are general rules for making piecemeal efficiency improvements. Both often use models containing empirically invalid assumptions and a selected few of the full set of distortions. Practical policy advice requires more parochial objective functions than community welfare; must rely on formal and appreciative theory, empirical evidence, and large doses of judgment; and should concentrate on making piecemeal improvements in context-specific situations.     

Value at risk and the cross-section of hedge fund returns

Using two large hedge fund databases, this paper empirically tests the presence and significance of a cross-sectional relation between hedge fund returns and value at risk (VaR). The univariate and bivariate portfolio-level analyses as well as the fund-level regression results indicate a significantly positive relation between VaR and the cross-section of expected returns on live funds. During the period of January 1995 to December 2003, the live funds with high VaR outperform those with low VaR by an annual return difference of 9%. This risk-return tradeoff holds even after controlling for age, size, and liquidity factors. Furthermore, the risk profile of defunct funds is found to be different from that of live funds. The relation between downside risk and expected return is found to be negative for defunct funds because taking high risk by these funds can wipe out fund capital, and hence they become defunct. Meanwhile, voluntary closure makes some well performed funds with large assets and low risk fall into the defunct category. Hence, the risk-return relation for defunct funds is more complicated than what implies by survival. We demonstrate how to distinguish live funds from defunct funds on an ex ante basis. A trading rule based on buying the expected to live funds and selling the expected to disappear funds provides an annual profit of 8–10% depending on the investment horizons.     

Knowledge Disclosure and Transmission in Buyer–Supplier Relationships

A buyer’s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one’s own rival due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive to transmit and, anticipating that, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.