The duality of bankruptcy process in Finland

Standard bankruptcy prediction methods lead to models weighted by the types of failure firms included in the estimation sample. These kinds of weighted models may lead to severe classification errors when they are applied to such types of failing (and non-failing) firms which are in the minority in the estimation sample (frequency effect). The purpose of this study is to present a bankruptcy prediction method based on identifying two different failure types, i.e. the solidity and liquidity bankruptcy firms, to avoid the frequency effect. Both of the types are depicted by a theoretical gambler's ruin model of its own to yield an approximation of failure probability separately for both types. These models are applied to the data of randomly selected Finnish bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. A logistic regression model based on a set of financial variables is used as a benchmark model. Empirical results show that the resulting heavily solidity-weighted logistic model may lead to severe errors in classifying non-bankrupt firms. The present approach will avoid these kinds of error by separately evaluating the probability of the solidity and liquidity bankruptcy; the firm is not classified bankrupt as long as neither of the probabilities exceeds the critical value. This leads the present prediction method slightly to outperform the logistic model in the overall classification accuracy.     

A new approach in constructing orthogonal and nearly orthogonal arrays

Orthogonal arrays have been constructed by a number of mathematical tools such as orthogonal Latin squares, Hadamard matrices, group theory and finite fields. Wang and Wu (1992) proposed the concept of a nearly orthogonal array and found a number of such arrays with high efficiency. In this paper we propose some criteria for non-orthogonality and two algorithms for the construction of orthogonal and nearly orthogonal arrays evincing higher efficiency than that obtained by Wang and Wu. Received: September 1999     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

On Forest Rotation under Interest Rate Variability

The current literature on optimal forest rotation makes the unrealistic assumption of a constant interest rate although harvesting decisions of forest stands are typically subject to relatively long time horizons. We apply the single rotation framework to extend the existing studies to cover the unexplored case of variable interest rate. We show that even in the deterministic case if the current interest rate deviates from its long-run steady state, interest rate variability may change the rotation age significantly when compared with the constant discounting case. Further, and importantly, allowing for interest rate uncertainty as a mean reverting process and forest value as a geometric Brownian motion, we can provide an explicit solution for the two dimensional path-dependent optimal stopping problem. Increased interest rate volatility is shown to lengthen the optimal rotation period. Numerical calculations show that interest rate volatility has a large quantitative importance.     

Agency Cost of Debt and Credit Market Imperfections: A Bargaining Approach

This paper studies the effect of credit market imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. However, lower relative bargaining power of banks leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky returns. Thus, our analysis does not support the view, presented in a large existing literature, that there would be a trade‐off between reduced credit market imperfections and higher agency costs of debt finance.     

Estimation of Internal Rate of Return Under Nonsteady Conditions

This study presents a method to estimate the IRR (internal rate of return) from published financial statement data under nonsteady conditions. The IRR is allowed to systematically change over time. The method provides an estimate for the current profitability of periodic total expenditure, its rate of change, and the firm-level profitability. Four competing steady and nonsteady statistical models are evaluated by simulation showing that a restricted nonsteady model may give the most reliable estimates. The model is applied to Finnish firms to illustrate how to use the model in practice. Three samples of publicly traded and nontraded firms are considered.     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.