A PRIMER ON GLOBAL GAMES APPLIED TO MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE

This paper shows how to solve global games applied to macroeconomics and finance. We ascertain the roles of public and private information for the determination of a unique equilibrium, and discuss the informative role of market prices. We examine the impact of public information on social welfare, comparing models with and without complementarities at the aggregate level.     

Licensing policies for a new product

This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with fixed fees but do not prefer the exclusive territory clause. Social welfare is higher under exclusive territories when fixed costs are not too large. As for efficiency, the number of licences in the private market equilibrium falls short of the socially optimal solution. Our analysis discloses that (i) any policy measures aimed at enhancing the diffusion of technology, in terms of the number of licences, would be welcomed and, (ii) the permissive treatment received by licensing agreements with exclusive territories is justified.     

Distilling network effects from Steam

Quantitative Marketing and Economics - This paper develops a method to estimate the demand for network goods, using minimal network data, but leveraging within-consumer variation. I estimate demand...     

Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: a review of literature on factors with influence on entrepreneurial intentions

Journal of International Entrepreneurship - The purpose of this paper is to review existing literature and show the state of the art regarding the factors that influence the entrepreneurial...     

Why do firms use fixed-term contracts?

Portuguese Economic Journal - In this article we look at how one specific form of temporary employment - employment with fixed-term contracts - fits into employers’ hiring policies. We find...     

Intermediate units in multinational corporations: A resource dependency view on coordinative versus entrepreneurial roles

Due to the dispersion of headquarters’ activities across organizational and geographical boundaries, intermediate units (IUs) are emerging as a key actor of international business. IUs are intermediate structural layers between headquarters (HQ) and local subsidiaries with specific HQ responsibilities. Our study relies on original data of 67 IUs and, taking on a Resource Dependence approach, explores empirically the two HQ roles attributed to IUs: coordinative versus entrepreneurial. According to our results, the main differences between both roles relate to external network embeddedness, internal network position and autonomy. We argue that these differences arise from the dominant sources of power in each role. These findings have signi?cant relevance for theory development and managerial practice as we provide a starting point for understanding the dispersion of complex HQ systems as well as how those systems are discharged and add value.     

Indigenous Peoples’ Health Care: New approaches to contracting and accountability at the public administration frontier

Abstract

This article analyses reforms to contracting and accountability for indigenous primary health care organizations in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. The reforms are presented as comparative case studies, the common reform features identified and their implications analysed.

The reforms share important characteristics. Each proceeds from implicit recognition that indigenous organizations are ‘co-principals’ rather than simply agents in their relationship with government funders and regulators. There is a common tendency towards more relational forms of contracting; and tentative attempts to reconceptualize accountability. These ‘frontier’ cases have broad implications for social service contracting.     

Flexibility at the Margin and Labor Market Volatility in OECD Countries*

We study the business‐cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting fixed‐term contracts). We present a matching model with temporary and permanent jobs (i) where there is a gap in the firing costs associated with these types of jobs and (ii) where there are restrictions in the creation and duration of fixed‐term contracts. We show that a labor market with ``flexibility at the margin'' increases the unemployment volatility with respect to one that is fully regulated. This analysis yields new insights into the interpretation of the recent volatility changes witnessed in the OECD area.     

Fiscal harmonization in the European Union with public inputs

Fiscal harmonization among the European Union member states is a goal involving major difficulties for its implementation. Each country faces a particular trade-off between fiscal revenues generated by taxation and the productive efficiency loss induced by their respective tax code. This paper provides a quantitative analysis of these trade-offs for a number of the European Union (EU-15) member states using a dynamic general equilibrium model with public inputs. Calibration of the model for the EU-15 member states provides the following results: i) the maximum tax revenue level is relatively far from the current tax levels for most countries; ii) the cases of Sweden, Denmark and Finland are anomalous, as productive efficiency can be gained by lowering tax rates without affecting fiscal revenues; iii) in general, countries would obtain efficiency gains without changing fiscal revenues by reducing the capital tax and increasing the labor tax; and iv) capital tax harmonization to the average capital tax rate can be done with quite small changes in both fiscal revenues and output for most countries.