The effects of technology shocks on hours and output: a robustness analysis

We analyze the effects of neutral and investment‐specific technology shocks on hours and output. Long cycles in hours are removed in a variety of ways. Hours robustly fall in response to neutral shocks and robustly increase in response to investment‐specific shocks. The percentage of the variance of hours (output) explained by neutral shocks is small (large); the opposite is true for investment‐specific shocks. ‘News shocks’ are uncorrelated with the estimated technology shocks. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis

Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market-to-book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.     

Debt Maturity: Is Long‐Term Debt Optimal?

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium , sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic-equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the US as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.     

When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.     

The Heisenberg picture in the analysis of stock markets and in other sociological contexts

We review some recent results concerning some toy models of stock markets. Our models are suggested by the discrete nature of the number of shares and of the cash which are exchanged in a real market, and by the existence of conserved quantities, like the total number of shares or some linear combination of the cash and the shares. This suggests to use the same tools used in quantum mechanics and, in particular, the Heisenberg picture to describe the time behavior of the portfolio of each trader. We finally propose the use of this same framework in other sociological contexts.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

The Euro Illusion in Consumers’ Price Estimation: An Italian–Irish Comparison in the Third Year of the Euro

The euro illusion is a transient phenomenon that consists of currency-related asymmetries in the intuitive judgment of product prices made by consumers. The results of a cross-country study in the third year after the introduction of the euro show a strong price estimation asymmetry in a country with an extreme exchange rate (Italy) and a weaker effect in a country in which the nominal values of the new and the old currency are much closer (Ireland). These results rule out proposed explanations of the euro illusion in price estimation that assume the sole influence of plausible anchors (reference prices stored in memory within the plausible price range), supporting instead accounts also endorsing the role of implausible anchors (reference prices outside the plausible price range). Beyond contributing to our theoretical understanding of the euro illusion, this research starts to unveil the interplay between structural factors (i.e., the currency exchange rate) and psychological mechanisms that produce long-lasting difficulties for consumers after a monetary changeover.

Accurate Short-Term Yield Curve Forecasting using Functional Gradient Descent

We propose a multivariate nonparametric technique for generatingreliable short-term historical yield curve scenarios and confidenceintervals. The approach is based on a Functional Gradient Descent(FGD) estimation of the conditional mean vector and covariancematrix of a multivariate interest rate series. It is computationallyfeasible in large dimensions and it can account for nonlinearitiesin the dependence of interest rates at all available maturities.Based on FGD we apply filtered historical simulation to computereliable out-of-sample yield curve scenarios and confidenceintervals. We back-test our methodology on daily USD bond datafor forecasting horizons from 1 to 10 days. Based on severalstatistical performance measures we find significant evidenceof a higher predictive power of our method when compared toscenarios generating techniques based on (i) factor analysis,(ii) a multivariate CCC-GARCH model, or (iii) an exponentialsmoothing covariances estimator as in the RiskMetrics^TM approach.     

MARSHALL'S CETERIS PARIBUS IN A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK

The paper aims to propose a formalization of the concept of ceteris paribus (CP) by means of a dynamic model. The basic result of the analysis is that the CP clause may assume essentially different meanings according to (1) the kind of variables assumed to be ‘frozen’ and (2) the length of the time horizon. It is then possible to distinguish, respectively, between an exogenous and an endogenous CP and, within the latter, between a short‐run and a long‐run CP. This double analytical distinction helps in understanding the role the CP clause plays in Marshall's thought and in economics in general.