The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in understanding stock return volatility

This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility. We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information” dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information” is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.     

Small firms and the value of improvements in corporate governance mechanisms

Since 2002, many firms have been required to alter their board of directors and committees to increase management monitoring. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) provide empirical evidence suggesting that investments in corporate governance may differ based on firm size, and that under-investing in monitoring may be more pronounced in smaller firms. To further test whether the benefits of recent changes in companies' governance mechanisms accrue to smaller firms that have underinvested in governance, we examine the stock market reaction to changes in board structure over the twenty-four months following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We construct a new composite measure of board structure and regress buy-and-hold abnormal returns on changes that occur in the Board Structure Index, finding that improvements in corporate governance quality result in economically significant abnormal returns accruing only to the smaller firms with weak initial board structures.     

A UK Empirical Test of the Larson-Gonedes Exchange Ratio Model

This paper adopts the Larson-Gonedes merger exchange ratio determination model to investigate the bargaining area in UK takeovers involving share-for-share exchanges. The model focuses on price-earnings ratios rather than share price returns and so is more consistent with practical valuation methods than other approaches. The basic model is extended for the UK to consider both cash alternative offers and mixed offers involving cash and equity consideration. The model is tested on a sample of 95 UK takeovers between 1984 and 1988 using consecutively unadjusted, FT All Share Index adjusted and beta adjusted price bases. The analysis adopts the conventional chi-square test used by Conn and Nielsen but, in addition, a new test is developed based on a Generalised Likelihood Ratio. We find that on an unadjusted price basis there is greater support for the Larson-Gonedes model in the UK than Conn and Nielsen found for the US. However, our extended model based on adjusted prices provides more cautious support. In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results and provide further evidence on the wealth effects on acquiring and acquired company shareholders.     

Testing a Model of Cognitive Budgetary Participation Processes in a Latent Variable Structural Equations Framework

Previous accounting research has suggested that subordinate participation in the budgetary process has two cognitive aspects: (1) participation enhances budget quality, and hence the utility of budgets, by allowing subordinates to introduce private knowledge into the budgetary process, and (2) participation enables subordinates to obtain information that is relevant to performing their jobs. This study tests a model that encompasses both cognitive aspects of budgetary participation. Data were gathered with a questionnaire distributed to managers from a variety of different national origins who were working in many different global locations. The data were analysed with latent variable structural equation modelling, which provides several advantages over more conventional analytic methods generally used in budgetary participation and other behavioural accounting research. The results indicated that participation enhances budget quality and that budget quality, in turn, has a positive effect on budget utility. Participation was also found to have a direct and positive effect on job-relevant information. The results failed to support a proposed indirect effect of participation on job-relevant information through the enhancement of budget quality.     

The effect of tax avoidance crackdown on corporate innovation

To constrain the use of intangible assets in tax-motivated state income shifting, many U.S. state governments adopted addback statutes. Addback statutes reduce the tax benefits that firms can gain from creating intangible assets such as patents. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we examine the effect of addback statutes on corporate innovation behavior. First, the adoption of addback statutes leads to a 4.77 percentage point decrease in the number of patents and a 5.12 percentage point decrease in the number of patent citations. Second, the “disappearing patents” resulting from addback statutes have significant economic value. Third, after a state adopts an addback statute, a firm with material subsidiaries in that state assigns fewer patents to subsidiaries in zero-tax states, whereas the number of patents assigned to the other states does not change. Overall, our findings suggest that addback statutes impede corporate innovation.     

Are fully independent audit committees really necessary?

Accounting scandals and concerns about the quality of financial statements have led to many calls for improved audit committee effectiveness. Prior research indicates that audit committee independence is positively related to effective oversight of the financial reporting process. Unfortunately, prior research has not provided an answer as to how much independence on the audit committee is enough. This is an important unanswered question because while Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) currently requires all listed companies to maintain an audit committee that is 100% independent there has been much debate regarding easing the SOX requirements for smaller and foreign companies. In this paper we examine whether the regulatory requirements of a completely independent audit committee are necessary to obtain the monitoring benefits related to audit committee independence that have been documented in prior literature. Our results suggest that the benefits of audit committee independence are consistently achieved only when the audit committee is completely independent. These results provide support for the SOX requirement of 100% independent audit committees.     

Words versus Actions about Organ Donation: A Four-Year Tracking Study of Attitudes and Self-Reported Behavior

Historically, the proportion of the American public that expresses positive views about organ donation exceeds the proportion that actually signs an organ donor card (ODC). The public seems to say one thing but does another. In July 1994, The Advertising Council, Inc., in conjunction with the Coalition on Donation, launched a major promotional campaign to educate the U.S. public about organ and tissue donation. This article reports on a four-year study tracking attitude toward organ donation and transplantation and its relationship with direct experience (knowing an organ recipient) and intermediate behaviors. The intermediate behaviors investigated are donating blood and signing an ODC. No significant changes were noted in attitude toward donation, but the proportion of individuals who had signed an ODC increased significantly.     

Reinforcement-Based Adaptive Learning in Asymmetric Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information

The sealed bidk-double auction is a mechanism used to structure bilateral bargaining under two-sided incomplete information. This mechanism is tested in two experiments in which subjects are asked to bargain repeatedly for 50 rounds with the same partner under conditions of information disparity favoring either the buyer (Condition BA) or seller (Condition SA). Qualitatively, the observed bid and offer functions are in agreement with the Bayesian linear equilibrium solution (LES) constructed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). A trader favored by the information disparity, whether buyer or seller, receives a larger share of the realized gain from trade than the other trader. Comparison with previous results reported by Daniel, Seale, and Rapoport (1998), who used randomly matched rather than fixed pairs, shows that when reputation effects are present this advantage is significantly enhanced. A reinforcement-based learning model captures the major features of the offer and bid functions, accounting for most of the variability in the round-to-round individual decisions.     

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: BALANCING THE BIASES?

In the past several years, efforts have been made to introduce the 1993 System of National Accounts (1993) SNA ) in most of the formerly centrally planned economies. In doing so, a number of problems have emerged, some of which are particular to the situation of these countries. Some of these problems will probably cause overestimates of national accounts variables, others will cause underestimates, and it would be purely coincidental if these effects cancel out. This paper discusses the most disconcerting issues in this situation, and possible solutions.