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We examine the association between board independence and the characteristics of non-GAAP earnings. Our results suggest that
companies with less independent boards are more likely to opportunistically exclude recurring items from non-GAAP earnings.
Specifically, we find that exclusions from non-GAAP earnings have a greater association with future GAAP earnings and operating
earnings when boards contain proportionally fewer independent directors. Consistent with the association between board independence
and the permanence of non-GAAP exclusions reflecting opportunism rather than the economics of the firm, we find that the association
declines following Regulation G and that managers appear to use exclusions to meet earnings targets prior to selling their
shares more often in firms with fewer independent board members. Overall, our results suggest that board independence is positively
associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings. 相似文献