The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union

This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordinationin the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable generalequilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporatetax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gainsfrom tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and taxbases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) Allscenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winnersand others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is thereforelikely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) Thelarge and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperationfor a subset of the Member States may be the most likely routetowards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losersfrom coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanismmay be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDPand welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa. (JELcodes: H25, H73, H87)     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Revisiting the democracy-private investment nexus: Does inequality matter?

Contrary to the predictions of a large theoretical literature, recent cross-country evidence suggests autocracies can generate statistically indistinguishable levels of private investment compared to democracies. We argue that the previous exclusion of inequality explains part of this puzzle. We model current investment as a function of investors’ beliefs about future tax rates, which are conditioned by the constraints on the Executive in setting tax rates and expropriating tax revenues. In democracies, where tax rates reflect the preferences of the median voter, investment declines with rising inequality. In autocracies, investor beliefs about future tax rates reflect the relative power of Elites compared to the Executive. As inequality rises, the increased resources available to Elites constrains the Executive’s ability to expropriate more tax revenues. The heterogeneous determinants of investor beliefs can explain the observed pattern of investment across regime types. We first test our predictions at the macro-level with cross-country data. We then test the behavioral underpinnings of our model with a novel laboratory experiment showing how inequality affects individual-level investment behavior dependent upon regime type. Results from both types of analyses show that when inequality is taken into account autocracies can generate similar levels of investment to democracies.     

The price effects of greening vacant lots: How neighborhood attributes matter

We identify the effects of greening vacant lots on nearby housing prices and show how neighborhood attributes matter to these outcomes. Using data from a longstanding program in Philadelphia, we find that prices for houses within 1,000 feet of a greened vacant lot rise by about 4%, consistent with the literature, with the effect size increasing over time. Using the extensive data available in Philadelphia, we show how these effects vary by the attributes of the neighborhood in which they occur, with larger effects in areas with a high share of vacant land and higher-than-average median household incomes, with peak responses estimated at 19% and 15%, respectively. We demonstrate the importance of sample selection bias adjustment for identification of the effect of vacant lot greening.