Vorschau

VORSCHAU

Vorschau     

An Examination of Frontline Cross-functional Integration during Retail Transactions

This research investigates cross-functional integration in contexts where customers interact with multiple frontline functions during a retail transaction. Specifically, this study: (1) proposes and empirically tests a framework for frontline cross-functional integration, (2) shows that joint reward valence alters the effects of other integration mechanisms in ways that can sometimes be detrimental, and (3) demonstrates the effects of cross-functional integration on individual sales performance and job satisfaction. The proposed framework is empirically tested in the automobile sales context with sales and finance as the frontline functions. Results indicate that cross-functional training and cohesion influence quality of communication, which in turns leads to more effective relationships. As joint reward valence increases, the positive impact of cross-functional training on communication quality is enhanced; however, the positive impact of cohesion on communication quality is reduced. Similarly, as joint reward valence increases, relationship effectiveness leads to higher individual sales performance but the positive benefits of relationship effectiveness on job satisfaction diminish. Thus, this study improves the understanding of frontline cross-functional integration and the process by which integration mechanisms influence employee outcomes.     

The 52-week high strategy and information uncertainty

This paper examines the driver of the 52-week high strategy, which is long in stocks close to their 52-week high price and short in stocks with a price far below their one-year high, and tests the hypothesis that this strategy’s profitability can be explained by anchoring—a behavioral bias. To test the null, we examine whether the 52-week high criterion has more predictive power in cases of larger information uncertainty. This hypothesis is based on the psychological insight that behavioral biases increase in uncertainty. For six proxies of ambiguity, we document a positive relationship to returns of 52-week high winner stocks and a negative relationship to returns of 52-week high loser stocks. The opposite effect of information uncertainty on winner and loser stocks implies that the 52-week high profits are increasing in uncertainty measures. Moreover, the study documents that the six variables have a similar impact on momentum profits. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that anchoring explains the profits of the 52-week high strategy and that it is the driver of the momentum anomaly.     

An econometric analysis of asymmetric volatility: Theory and application to patents

The purpose in registering patents is to protect the intellectual property of the rightful owners. Deterministic and stochastic trends in registered patents can be used to describe a country's technological capabilities and act as a proxy for innovation. This paper presents an econometric analysis of the symmetric and asymmetric volatility of the patent share, which is based on the number of registered patents for the top 12 foreign patenting countries in the USA. International rankings based on the number of foreign US patents, patent intensity (or patents per capita), patent share, the rate of assigned patents for commercial exploitation, and average rank scores, are given for the top 12 foreign countries. Monthly time series data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office for January 1975 to December 1998 are used to estimate symmetric and asymmetric models of the time-varying volatility of the patent share, namely US patents registered by each of the top 12 foreign countries relative to total US patents. A weak sufficient condition for the consistency and asymptotic normality of the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) of the univariate GJR(1,1) model is established under non-normality of the conditional shocks. The empirical results provide a diagnostic validation of the regularity conditions underlying the GJR(1,1) model, specifically the log-moment condition for consistency and asymptotic normality of the QMLE, and the computationally more straightforward but stronger second and fourth moment conditions. Of the symmetric and asymmetric models estimated, AR(1)–EGARCH(1,1) is found to be suitable for most countries, while AR(1)–GARCH(1,1) and AR(1)–GJR(1,1) also provide useful insights. Non-nested procedures are developed to test AR(1)–GARCH(1,1) versus AR(1)–EGARCH(1,1), and AR(1)–GJR(1,1) versus AR(1)–EGARCH(1,1).     

Kausalität und Funktionalität in der Wirtschaftstheorie

Ohne Zusammenfassung Schlu? folgt     

Mobile termination and collusion,revisited

The standard model by Laffont et al. (RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1): 1–37, 1998a; 38–56, 1998b) treats termination fees as an instrument to increase market power in a one-shot game of horizontal product differentiation. A prediction (Gans and King, Economics Letters, 71: 413–420, 2001) within this framework is that, with non-linear tariffs, firms should be interested in low termination fees. This seems to be at odds with regulatory experience in many countries. We offer an alternative approach, using an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition. We focus on symmetrical calling patterns and investigate simple two-part tariffs for two customer types, as well as general non-linear tariffs for two types and for a continuum of types. In this framework, when looking also at collusion in retail prices, termination fees make deviations from the collusive outcome less attractive. The optimum deviation strategy is usually to try to attract the high valuation customers since they exhibit the highest profits. Thus, a deviator will have a pool of heavy users which will have more outgoing than incoming calls, implying net termination payments. A cooperatively chosen termination rate can increase the deviator’s cost and thereby always stabilizes collusion.      

An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

We report on experiments examining the value of commitment in Stackelberg games where the follower chooses whether to pay some cost to perfectly observe the leader's action. Várdy [Games Econ. Behav. (2004)] shows that in the unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the value of commitment is lost completely; however, there exists a mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the value of commitment is fully preserved. In the data, the value of commitment is largely preserved when the cost of looking is small, while it is lost when the cost is large. Nevertheless, for small observation costs, equilibrium behavior is clearly rejected. Instead, subjects persistently play non-equilibrium strategies in which the probability of the follower choosing to observe the leader's action is a decreasing function of the observation cost.