THE DYNAMICS OF REAL EXCHANGE RATES: A RECONSIDERATION

In this paper we offer a bootstrap‐based version of the Cox specification test for non‐nested hypothesis to discriminate between ESTAR and MSAR models. Both models are commonly used for modeling real exchange rates dynamics. We show that the test has good size and power properties in finite samples. In an application, we analyze several major real exchange rates to shed light on the question of which model describes these processes best. This allows us to draw conclusions about the driving forces of real exchange rates. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Using surveys of business perceptions as a guide to growth‐enhancing fiscal reforms

This paper assesses the merits of using business perceptions of growth constraints as a guide to growth‐enhancing fiscal policy reforms. Using endogenous growth models in which the government levies an income tax to provide public inputs to the production of private firms, the paper demonstrates that such perceptions of growth constraints may be misleading from a policy perspective. In particular, firms can be expected to systematically overestimate the growth‐enhancing effects of lower tax rates relative to public services and public capital, and underestimate the growth‐enhancing effects of greater provision of public capital relative to taxation and public services. In addition, we show that firms rank different public services and different types of public capital according to the actual costs they impose on firms. It is then shown that these theoretical predictions regarding how firms rank constraints correspond closely to the observed ranking of constraints by firms in the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys.     

A SURVEY ON THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS FROM A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

This study reviews the existing evidence on the effects of tax reforms on output levels and growth over the short and long run from different strands of the literature. It develops and applies criteria to evaluate the usefulness of ex‐post estimates to predict the effects of tax reforms ex ante. Based on these criteria, we present detailed tables summarizing and comparing ex‐post estimates of the effects of tax reforms. Overall, our review suggests that at least the direction of the short‐run and long‐run growth effects can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty, but there is disagreement with respect to the magnitude. Our review also suggests that depending on the tax change, trade‐offs between short‐run stabilization and long‐run growth may arise and that more research on this question is needed. (JEL E62, H20, O20)     

Market Liberalization,Regulatory Uncertainty,and Firm Investment

This paper analyzes the effects of regulatory uncertainty regarding labor costs on investment in a liberalized market. We distinguish between the external investment margin (market entry) and the internal investment margin (technology), and establish that regulatory uncertainty affects these margins differently, encouraging market entry, but discouraging technological investment. As a consequence, the impact of regulatory uncertainty on competition in liberalized markets is a combination of these two countervailing forces.     

On the power of indicators: how the choice of fuel poverty indicator affects the identification of the target population

In light of the creation of the EU Energy Poverty Observatory (EPOV) in January 2018 and the increase in debates on how fuel poverty is measured, we propose a critical analysis of fuel poverty indicators and demonstrate that choosing a given indicator is central to the identification of the fuel-poorpopulation.

First, we conducted an inter-indicator analysis to show how profiles of fuel-poor households vary depending on the indicator selected. We designed a multidimensional approach based on a multiple correspondence analysis and a hierarchical and partitioning clustering analysis to study characteristics of fuel-poor households. We highlight the difficulty of identifying a fuel-poor ‘typical profile’ and show that the composition of the population depends on the choice of the indicator.

Second, we applied an intra-indicator analysis using two objective expenditure-based indicators with thresholds. In particular, we conducted a sensitivity analysis based on a logit model including variables describing household and dwelling characteristics. We show that the profiles of fuel-poor households as well as the drivers of fuel poverty vary considerably with the chosen threshold level.Given these findings, we stress the need to review how we currently rely on conventional fuel poverty indicators to identify target groups and give some recommendations.     

Non-cooperative exploitation of multi-cohort fisheries—The role of gear selectivity in the North-East Arctic cod fishery

North-East Arctic cod is shared by Russia and Norway. Taking its multi-cohort structure into account, how would optimal management look like? How would non-cooperative exploitation limit the obtainable profits? To which extent could the strategic situation explain today’s over-harvesting? Simulation of a detailed bio-economic model reveals that the mesh size should be significantly increased, resulting not only in a doubling of economic gains, but also in a biologically healthier age-structure of the stock. The Nash equilibrium is close to the current regime. Even when effort is fixed to its optimal level, the non-cooperative choice of gear selectivity leads to a large dissipation of rents.     

Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers, as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behaviour of a monopolist. Several control treatments corroborate this finding.     

Information Sharing in Contests

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.