Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.     

Risk and Capital Structure in the Regulated Firm

This paper studies the role of capital structure in a regulated firm. We show that it affects the prices set by the regulator, the expected price being lower the higher the proportion of debt finance. However, when debt is increased beyond a certain level, the benefit of lower expected prices is offset by their increased variability. We also study the socially preferred capital structure. This is such that consumers carry some risk, in the form of higher prices in adverse economic conditions.     

Specialisation,localisation, and trade value in the wake of cross-border production sharing. The Central Eastern European Countries' case

We focus on five among the sectors in which most of the CEECs’ trade in middle products with EU-15 is concentrated. Over the second half of the 1990s, we observe remarkable changes in both production and trade specialization as well as a significant relocation of industries within CEECs. Using jointly trade and production data we outline co-movements in the adjustment of specialisation patterns. We also show that the redistribution of activities at the regional level reflects the relocation of industries at the global level. Finally, we try to detect the scope of fragmentation of production characterizing each industry and the ways in which CEECs are moving along the “internationally sliced-up value chain”. (JEL: F10, F14, F15)     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

The establishment-size wage premium: evidence from European countries

This study examines the magnitude and determinants of the establishment-size wage premium in five European countries using a unique harmonised matched employer–employee data set (the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey). This data set enables to test the validity of various traditional explanations of the size wage gap (i.e. the labour quality hypothesis, the theory of compensating wage differentials, the role of monitoring and institutions) and of more recent hypotheses (i.e. size differences in job stability and in the concentration of skilled workers). We find some support for traditional explanations, but there remains a significant wage premium for workers employed in large establishments. Further results indicate that the magnitude of this premium fluctuates substantially across countries and appears to be negatively correlated with the degree of corporatism.     

On the Endogeneous Formation of Secondary Employment Centers in a City

A new approach is proposed to explain the formation of secondary employment centers in a monocentric city. Specifically, a large firm considers locating a new plant in a city where none of the existing businesses has a significative share of the labor force, so that its location can be viewed as a secondary employment center. The choice of this location results from the interplay between the process of competition on both the labor and land markets and the technological externalities generated by the proximity of the city center where other firms are located.     

GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLY

Abstract. In this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly, that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

基于成本的物流中心优化设计研究

如何有效地优化物流中心布局设计 ,以便在控制成本的同时提升产品的附加值 ,是众多企业面临的一个共同问题。本文从物流中心设置及配送方案着手 ,提出了相关的优化方法以期解决这一问题。     

The Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals in a Complex World

We develop a nonlinear exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents. Some agents adopt a “fundamentalist” forecasting rule, while others use a “chartist” forecasting rule. We show that the model is capable of explaining the empirical puzzles relating to exchange rate movements. In particular, the model explains the “exchange rate determination” and PPP puzzles, the excess volatility, and fat tails in exchange rate returns.