Evaluating the impact of nonreciprocal trade preferences using gravity models

This article presents new evidence on the impact of Nonreciprocal Preferential Trade Policies (NRPTPs) granted by developed countries to exports from developing countries over the period 1995 to 2003. The analysis has been carried out by using three levels of data aggregation. It accounts for unobservable heterogeneity, endogeneity of the preferential treatment and potential selection bias. We find a positive and significant impact of NRPTPs when considering total exports and total agricultural exports. However, at 2-digit agricultural level the results are heterogeneous.     

Mistaken self-perception and equilibrium

Summary. Motivated by real-world information economics problems and by experimental findings on overconfidence, this paper introduces a general epistemic construction to model strategic interaction with incomplete information, where the players self-perception may be mistaken. This allows us to rigorously describe equilibrium play, by formulating appropriate equilibrium concepts. We show that there always exist objective equilibria, where the players correctly anticipate each others strategies without attempting to make sense of them, and that these outcomes coincide with the equilibria of an associated Bayesian game with subjective priors. In population games, these equilibria can also be always introspectively rationalized by the players, despite their possibly mistaken self-perception.Received: Received: May, 12, 2003; revised version: 3 December 2004, Revised: 3 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: J31, D82, D83.I thank Massimiliano Amarante, Eddie Dekel, Massimo Marinacci, Jean Francois Mertens, Giuseppe Moscarini, Paolo Siconolfi, Marciano Siniscalchi, Joel Sobel, and an anonymous referee.     

Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy

This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis’ ((2002) Veto Players: Foundations of Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court’s activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller ((1990). A rational choice theory of supreme court statutory decisions with applications to the state farm and grove city cases. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 263–300). In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether to alter or not the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court’s decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956–2001 annual time series data for Italy.

The impact of decentralization and inter-territorial interactions on Spanish health expenditure

This paper examines the determinants of regional public health expenditure in a decentralised health system. Unlike previous studies we take into account possible policy and political interactions among authorities, as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Our emprirical contribution lies in running a spatial panel specification using a dataset of all Spanish region states on aggregated and disaggregated health expenditures (pharmaceuticals, inpatient and primary care). Results are consistent with some degree of interdependence between neighboring regions in spending decisions. Empirical evidence of long term efficiency effects of health care decentralisation, suggests that a specific spatial-institutional design might improve the health system efficiency as well as regional cohesion. Political and scale effects are consistent with theoretical predictions.     

A theoretical analysis of alternative approaches to financial regulation

This paper studies alternative regulatory approaches within the framework of intermediaries' capital requirements, one of the cornerstones of modern financial regulation. The basic assumptions are that the intermediary's capital is valued as a down-and-out call option written on its own assets and that the optimal capital requirement is the one minimizing the total expected social costs. The analysis discusses the total expected costs' function within three alternative regulatory contexts and allows for a comparison of alternative approaches formalized by a set of five fundamental propositions explaining the impact of the regulatory choice on critical aspects such as the intermediary's capital size and riskiness, his/her assets' choice, the competition among either different intermediaries or different functions and, last but not least, the intermediary's operational structure.     

Preference shifts between consumption goods and sectoral changes

This paper analyzes under which conditions a shift in the relative preferences between consumption goods may induce a change in the equilibrium values of the sectoral variables in the same direction, compared with the previous static equilibrium.     

Income inequality and the development of environmental technologies

Within rich countries, a large dispersion in the capacity of generating environmental innovations appears correlated to the level of inequality. Previous works analyze the relationship between inequality and environmental quality in a static setting. This paper builds a dynamic model more suitable to analyze technological externalities driven by the emergence of a new demand for green products. Under fairly general assumptions on technology and preferences, we show that: 1. the relationship between inequality and environmental innovation is highly non-linear and crucially depends on per-capita income; 2. an excessive inequality harms the development of environmental technologies especially in rich countries. Key to our results is the fact that externalities generated by pioneer consumers of green products benefit the entire population only for relatively low income distances. The empirical analysis robustly confirms our theoretical results, that is: whereas for rich countries inequality negatively affects the diffusion of innovations, per-capita income is paramount in poorer ones.     

Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity

Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in their pollution intensity. When innovations are environment-friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods which are the most productive. In this case, the tax has to increase along a balanced growth path to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. Comparing balanced growth paths, we find that tightening the policy stance spurs innovation, because it increases the market share of recent vintages, and promotes environment-friendly technological progress. As a result the cost of environmental policy in terms of slower growth is weaker.