Regional Economic Disparity,Financial Disparity,and National Economic Growth: Evidence from China

The dynamic relations among national economic growth, economic disparity, and financial disparity in China are examined. Specifically, the focus is on whether economic disparity or financial disparity affects national economic growth. As measures of economic and financial disparity across regions and provinces, the Williamson coefficient of disparity is employed using both regional data (eastern, central, and western) and provincial data (from 31 provinces). Overall, it is found that both provincial financial disparity and, to a lesser degree, economic disparity have a negative effect on national economic growth. In addition, financial disparity appears to be exogenous, suggesting that financial disparity is not influenced by either economic disparity or national economic growth.     

PRICE DYNAMICS,FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND ANTICIPATED SHOCKS IN A TOURISM ECONOMY

Using a dynamic model of an open monetary economy, this paper examines the effects of tourism‐related anticipated shocks on goods prices and foreign exchange reserves. Foreign tourists consume mainly non‐traded goods in holiday destinations, converting them into exportable goods. This gives rise to a tourism terms‐of‐trade effect that affects the accumulation of foreign exchange. Announcements of anticipated events bring tourist visits forward, resulting in an initial under‐adjustment or an over‐adjustment in the prices of the non‐traded goods when the tourism terms‐of‐trade effect is positive or negative. This leads to an increase or a decrease in foreign reserves in the long run.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

An Experimental Study on Dividing Gains through Politics

This article offers experimental evidence to examine an important case in politics where a monopolistic proposer seeks a majority's consent from competitive responders to split the gain. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the side of trade with a monopoly will exploit the side of trade with competition to reap almost all of the gain. Our experimental evidence reveals that while responders do compete with each other to race to the bottom (consistent with the prediction), the monopolistic proposer settles down to offer a ‘fair’ share of the pie to those from whom he or she seeks majority support (contrary to the prediction).     

Can tax regulations moderate revenue diversification and reduce financial distress in nonprofit organizations?

As a result of policies to reduce public deficit, nonprofit organizations have been forced to turn to charitable donations in order to diversify their revenue structure and thus reduce their levels of financial distress. Public administrations have supported this process through tax mechanisms designed to provide a legal framework that will encourage private philanthropy. Our aim is to analyse the role of nonprofit tax regulations in moderating the influence of revenue diversification on insolvency risk. To this end, we drew a sample of 406 nonprofit organizations located in Aragon and Navarre, two European regions with different tax regulations, for the period 2008–2018. Our results reveal that some tax regime requirements, such as the organizational purpose, minimum initial endowment, engagement in commercial activity, and accountability and monitoring standards, have a positive impact on revenue diversification and the reduction of financial distress and vulnerability. However, we also detect differences between regions which suggest that tax harmonization for nonprofit organizations remains a challenge.     

Nesting Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation with Location Choices

This study solves a location‐then‐price game in which horizontal and vertical differentiation are combined using an asymmetric distribution of consumers’ taste. Boundary locations are robust when the taste disparity of the population is not large and out‐of‐market locations are not allowed. Firms may have incentives to move either inside or outside the market in other situations, so the equilibrium prices are never differentiated. The restrictions of vertical differentiation under this framework are further examined. A model with the entrance of a vertically differentiated product is also discussed.     

Interest rates,expectations and the credibility of the Bank of Spain

The purpose of the paper is to pinpoint the date of the change of monetary policy regime which occurred in Spain during the year 1984, when it moved away from controlling monetary aggregates towards interest rate targeting. The most likely date for the change is estimated and, surprisingly, there is evidence that agents learned about the new intermediate target quite rapidly.A week after the change, the term structure of interest rates showed how market agents attributed much more informational content to interest rate changes than they had previously. Two types of transitions are tried: a one-step and a gradual logistic swithing function.     

Understanding the demand-side of economic change: a contribution to formal evolutionary theorizing

An outstanding fact of capitalist change in the last few centuries is the ongoing emergence of new consumption alternatives which accompany income and productivity growth in expanding economies. Far from satiating consumers, exponential economic growth seems to stimulate human desires by providing novelty and variety embodied in a persuasive flow of unsettling goods. Although this is a well-known fact characteristic of capitalist change, little attention has been paid by modern growth theorists to the understanding of demand-side phenomena related to the increasing significance of consumption activities in our societies. Against this background, in this article, we show that as soon as we start drawing the demand-side contour of economic change, new phenomena appear which enrich our understanding of economic growth and structural change. By using ‘replicator dynamics’ systems, consumption dynamics are formally linked to the ongoing generation of innovations in capitalist economies. Certain emergent properties concerning economic growth and structural change and several policy implications follow.     

DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY

We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant‐dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.