Expense preference behavior in trucking: An empirical note

This note offers a statistical model which points out that the goal of publicly regulated firms often deviates from profit-maximization. Using a large firm-level panel data set from the trucking industry, we offer estimates which suggest that firm managers of the more heavily regulated common carriers practice utility maximization through higher salaries and more lucrative benefits than the managers (CEOs) of less regulated contract carriers. Our results add to the body of empirical work which supplements the theory of the firm developed by Ronald Coase.     

An iterative method for determining the internal rate of return

This paper presents an alternative to the usual iterative method for determining the approximate internal rate of return in capital budgeting. The method developed is based on the standard numerical analysis technique of successive approximations or iterations. The iterations converge to the true internal rate of return provided only that the initial cash outflow is greater than the salvage value. A comparison is made of the rates of convergence of the iteration method, Newton's method and the bisection method. Under certain restrictive conditions, the payback reciprocal is seen to play an important role in all three methods.     

Uncertainty and optimal stabilization policy

The impact of uncertainty on optimal stabilization policies is examined in the context of a simple reduced form model. The major finding of the paper is that, in the presence of instrument costs, the dynamic effects of uncertainty can induce an optimal stochastic policy which is more vigorous than the optimal deterministic policy. This result contrasts with the well-known conclusion for static models that uncertainty typically generates optimal responses equally or less intense than deterministic ones.     

Corporate governance and elites

Using a qualitative methodology (interviews), we examine the relationship between the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and elitist interventions. In doing this, we identify three elitist groups – political, cultural and religious, and investigate how they shape the legitimacy and effectiveness (or otherwise) of the institutional drivers of corporate governance in Nigeria. We caution the widely-held notion in the literature which suggests that institutions act as a check on the behaviour of elites and influence how elites compete and emerge. Alternatively, we argue that elites, in the presence of institutional voids, can invent, circumvent and corrupt institutions.     

The Interplay among Financial Regulations,Resilience, and Growth

Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting in place more regulations with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and the arbitrage opportunities through the regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to be more concentrated in the regulated entities and for other activities to leave the banking into new shadow banking areas. How can we design an effective regulatory framework that would perfectly rule out bank runs and TBTF and to do so without introducing incentives for financial firms to take excessive risk? It is important for financial regulations to be coordinated across regulatory entities and jurisdictions and for financial regulations to be forward looking, rather than aiming to address problems of the past.     

Neither Principles Nor Rules: Making Corporate Governance Work in Sub-Saharan Africa

Corporate governance is often split between rule-based and principle-based approaches to regulation in different institutional contexts. This split is often informed by the types of institutional configurations, their strengths, and the complementarities within them. This approach to corporate governance regulation is mostly discussed in the context of developed economies and their regulatory demands. However, in developing and weak market economies, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no such explicit split and the debates on such contexts in the comparative corporate governance literature have been meagre. Nonetheless, there are sparks of good corporate governance practices in the region. Drawing from institutional theory and a case study of a largest economy, we explore the appropriateness or suitability of corporate governance regulatory frameworks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings suggest that Nigeria needs an integrated system that combines elements of both rule-based and principle-based regulation, supported by a multi-stakeholder co-regulation strategy. This paper departs from the mainstream rule-based and principle-based categorisations by forging ahead new perspectives on corporate governance regulation, especially in weak market economies.