The dynamics of networked power in a concentrated business network

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of networked power in a concentrated business network. Power is a long standing theme in inter-organizational research, yet there is a paucity of studies about how power emerges and is constructed over time at the network level. The paper adopts process, systems and network theory to interpret a rich single case study from the food industry. Three power mechanisms are identified, gatekeeping, decoupling and resource allocation, which form the basis of a model of networked power dynamics. Empirically tracing the dynamics of networked power highlights the economic contents of interactions. The paper extends current understandings of power as ‘conflict and coercion’ to include influencing, leveraging and strategic maneuvering in the actual performance of networked power.     

A dynamic model of the interaction between the state and the private sector

The main characteristic of the micro model developed in this paper is the endogenous behaviour of the state. The state is treated as an organization in its own right, made up of politicians and bureaucrats. Its behaviour is related to the interests of these agents and their relative power within the state organization. The economic consequenses of this interest representation by the state, and the impact of structural coercion (constraints), originating from the private sector, on these consequences, are our main concern. A particular feature of the model is that it allows for the fact that technology may be dependent on the state's activities.     

Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

Difficulties faced by the Economic and Monetary Union have strengthened the position of those who advocate a process of (further) political integration in the European Union (EU). A widespread fear is, though, that such a process would favor powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU policymakers. Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that political centralization will increase the size of the government through lobbying because of free-riding incentives created by federally funded programs with localized benefits. We extend their analysis by presenting a model where the budgeting process is divided into two stages, instead of one, which better captures the EU institutional framework. A federal legislator (the Council) chooses the size of the budget at one stage, while a federal agency (the Commission) chooses the allocation of the budget at the next stage. We show that separation of powers in the budgeting process restricts free riding and, therefore, reduces the incentives to lobby. The result is an unchanged budget under centralization. Moreover, it is shown that if the lobbying activity is directed to both policymakers, competitive lobbying may actually reduce the size of the public sector under centralized policymaking.     

De-materialising and re-materialising: digital technologies and the environment

Drawing on recent literature on the environmental impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet, this paper identifies three main types of effects: direct impacts of the production and use of ICTs on the environment (resource use and pollution related to the production of infrastructure and devices, electricity consumption of hardware, electronic waste disposal); indirect impacts related to the effect of ICTs on production processes, products and distribution systems (de-materialisation, substitution of information goods for material goods, and substitution of communication at a distance for travel); and structural/behavioural impacts, mainly through the stimulation of structural change and growth in the economy by ICTs, and through impacts on life styles and value systems. This paper argues that the diffusion and use of ICTs are leading to both positive and negative environmental impacts. However, because the effects of ICTs on economic activity are pervasive, their impacts on the environment are difficult to trace and measure. The paper argues for a need to move beyond the dichotomy between pessimism and optimism demonstrated in much of the emerging literature. Instead the relationship must be recognised as complex, interdependent, deeply uncertain and scale-dependent.     

An M-sector,N-group behavioral model of self-employment

A behavioral model is developed to determine the number of self-employed individuals in an economy characterized by different production sectors and social groups of which the individuals differ by their risk-aversion, their evaluation of job characteristics other than income, their expected managerial ability, the variance of their managerial ability and their productive performance as employee. The model leads to a linear complementarity problem that can be solved by the Lemke-algorithm. The 1-sector, n-group model and the m-sector, 2-group model are singled out for an extensive comparative static analysis.The research reported in this paper is part of the project Economics of Political Decision-making of the University of Amsterdam. We acknowledge the financial support obtained from the Ministry of Economic Affairs by way of the Research Institute for Small and Medium-Sized Business. We are grateful to M. A. Keyzer and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. We further acknowledge the comments by P. S. A. Renaud, A. R. Thurik, A. J. M. Kleijweg, and participants in the 1987 meeting of the European Economic Association and the 1987 Econometric Society European Meeting (both in Copenhagen) on an earlier version of this paper. All errors and omissions remain our responsibility.     

Environmental taxes and industry monopolization

This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The government selects a tax per unit of emission to maximize social welfare. The size of the tax rate affects whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the conditions that create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and incumbent firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable monopolization by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.      

Institutional Antecedents of the Corporate Social Responsibility Narrative in the Developing World Context: Implications for Sustainable Development

Efforts to understand the background to perceptions and manifestation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the developing world need to focus on establishing their link with the challenges of socio‐economic governance and societal expectations and cultural traditions. This signifies a departure from a western centric understanding of CSR but also an over‐focus on CSR as philanthropy. This study considers the Malawian tourism industry and finds that its colonial legacy, post‐colonialism development thinking and the national education system explain the prevalence of a ‘CSR as philanthropy’ agenda. When these factors interact with challenges of socio‐economic governance and societal expectations, however, the universality thesis that has often been associated with the theory and implementation CSR can be challenged. These findings therefore suggest a shift from the western centric CSR thinking to a CSR perspective that is strongly grounded in local values and norms and which meets the expectations of the global society. This indicates a way forward if CSR is to be adequately institutionalized in the developing world. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

The No Surcharge Rule and Merchant Competition

We analyze the no surcharge rule (NSR) and its impact on merchant competition by comparing different surcharging regimes. Any constraint on surcharging, including the NSR is shown to be a competition-softening device. A NSR may induce socially excessive card use. Allowing imperfectly competitive merchants to surcharge may lead to socially too little card use. Under a NSR, increased cost of card acceptance increases all prices, even the prices of a merchant not accepting cards. Under the NSR cards yielding no social surplus may be viable. This is not the case without the NSR. Card-use rewards may hurt consumers.