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81.
Local compensation payments for agri-environmental externalities: a panel data analysis of bargaining outcomes 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Hackl Franz; Halla Martin; Pruckner Gerald J. 《European Review of Agricultural Economics》2007,34(3):295-320
We analyse local compensation payments made to farmers for providinglandscape amenities in Alpine tourist communities. These paymentsresult from political bargaining at the municipal level. Paneldata estimation shows that the probability of introducing compensationpayments depends positively on the benefits of landscape amenities.Although no impact of service provision cost is found, transactioncosts at different levels of the bargaining process reduce theprobability of payments. Compensation payments mainly occurin communities where the provision of agricultural landscapeservices is perceived as relatively low and the diversity ofthe countryside seems to be endangered. We argue that municipalcompensation payments are an important supplement to nationaland European Union policy measures in support of less-favouredareas. 相似文献
82.
Franz Gehrels 《Atlantic Economic Journal》2009,37(4):327-333
The Hicksian general equilibrium with money and securities is the starting point for an expansion with numerous other financial
variables. Disturbances to the system, partly observed from recent experience, are examined, and possible remedies are proposed.
Walras’ Law, that the sum of excess demands for goods and basic factors is zero, no longer applies in an economy where financial
variables are present. The main analysis is of a closed economy; the open economy, in the manner introduced by Mosak, is treated
in an appendix. 相似文献
83.
This paper considers a non-renewable resource cartel facing constraints on cooperation. Although different kinds of constraints are conceivable and some of them are also investigated, the analysis focuses on the case in which cooperation is restricted to sufficiently high quotas. This approach of imposing constraints on cartelization complements papers that assume exogenously when a monopoly ends (in particular Benchekroun, H., Gaudet, G., Van Long, N., 2006. Temporary natural resource cartels. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663–674) in two aspects: an endogenous determination when the cartel breaks up and the consequence that it is impossible to shift resource sales between the two regimes. 相似文献
84.
What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk‐Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms 下载免费PDF全文
Nils D. Kraiczy Andreas Hack Franz W. Kellermanns 《Journal of Product Innovation Management》2015,32(3):334-348
Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk‐oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation‐related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium‐sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk‐taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium‐sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk‐taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk‐taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm‐specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously. 相似文献
85.
86.
Franz Wirl 《Journal of Economics》2009,97(2):97-119
This paper provides a tractable analytical framework to study intertemporal equilibria between non-competitive supply and
dynamic demand for non-durable goods. The basic hypothesis is that consumers enjoy utility from particular services rather
than from commodities. Consumption of the non-durable good follows a dynamic pattern, because it depends on the stock of durables
and energy demand provides the prototypical example, e.g., mobility, thermal comfort, etc. are the output of a combination
of durable and non-durable goods. Indeed, turmoils in energy markets are to a great deal due to short run inflexibility and
this gives this theoretical paper a topical flavour. The outcomes differ substantially across the strategic setups while differences
in expectations (myopic versus rational) matter only transiently but not in the long run.
相似文献
87.
This paper reviews the United States' experience with utility sponsored energy conservation programs. Such programs are central to the recent discussions about electric utility regulation in the United States and elsewhere. First it is shown that these programs are exposed to three problems on the consumers' side – rebound, adverse selection and moral hazard – which lower the effectiveness of conservation incentives and impede in most practical cases a reliable quantification of the achieved conservation. Moreover, the utilities have under the regulatory practice an incentive to invest in conservation measures but to limit factual conservation through a proper design of the program. Reviewing the recent literature shows that these four crucial points, which affect many of the applied conservation programs, are either insufficiently covered (rebound and adverse selection) or neglected entirely (moral hazard and regulated utilities' interest in little conservation). We conclude, that this undertaking has resulted in insignificant conservation and doubt the adequacy of these programs to reduce external social costs from energy use. 相似文献
88.
Franz Wirl 《Economics of Planning》1991,24(3):181-202
The recent political changes will not only affect the domestic economies of the Eastern European countries but also important world commodity markets. This paper investigates the consequences for world energy markets. For this purpose, a disaggregated model of the Eastern European energy markets is developed that accounts for the introduction markets (pricing) into the formerly central planned economies. Deregulation will stimulate conservation and will favour noble fuels, i.e. oil, gas and electricity. (Potential) net energy exports will slightly increase by 1995 where gas exports could compensate for the decline in oil exports. 相似文献
89.
Franz Wirl 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):73-89
This paper considers low dimensional (more precisely, one state variable) dynamic optimisation problems of competitive agents.
These individual decisions lead to a dynamic externality for the evolution of the system. However, the impact of an individual
and competitive agent is negligible and thus each agent considers this evolution as exogenous data. This leads, assuming rational
expectations (perfect foresight due to the deterministic set up), to motions in the three dimensional space of state, costate
and externality. Considering the fact that such externalities are widespread, e.g., R&D in the literature on new growth theory,
pollution in environmental economics, etc., the incorporation of such externalities due to competitive markets is important,
yet this incorporation may alter the stability of the system. Indeed, complex policies such as stable limit cycles are sustainable
in such a low-dimensional economy, even for a separable and strictly concave model. 相似文献
90.
Univ.-Ass. Dr. Franz Wirl 《Journal of Economics》1991,54(3):227-249
This paper studies optimal noncompetitive pricing strategies when the evolution of demand is the result of intertemporal considerations. Two different hypotheses of price expectations (myopia and perfect foresight) are treated. The major implication is that the slight modification from an instantaneous to a very fast consumer reaction may completely modify a monopolist's price strategy. More precisely, the price strategy should be volatile if the equilibrium demand is convex, independent whether the consumers act myopically or employ rational expectations. On the other hand, asynchronous dynamics (e.g., due to competitive fringe supply or different segments of demand) cannot explain even damped price oscillations. The equilibrium price strategy of the noncompetitive supplier exceeds the static rule if consumers employ myopic expectations; rational expectations may lead to prices above or below the static rule depending on the rate of discount.I am grateful for the helpful and elaborate comments from three anonymous referees. 相似文献