The Impact of Land-Use Change on Ecosystem Services,Biodiversity and Returns to Landowners: A Case Study in the State of Minnesota

Land-use change has a significant impact on the world’s ecosystems. Changes in the extent and composition of forests, grasslands, wetlands and other ecosystems have large impacts on the provision of ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation and returns to landowners. While the change in private returns to landowners due to land-use change can often be measured, changes in the supply and value of ecosystem services and the provision of biodiversity conservation have been harder to quantify. In this paper we use a spatially explicit integrated modeling tool (InVEST) to quantify the changes in ecosystem services, habitat for biodiversity, and returns to landowners from land-use change in Minnesota from 1992 to 2001. We evaluate the impact of actual land-use change and a suite of alternative land-use change scenarios. We find a lack of concordance in the ranking of baseline and alternative land-use scenarios in terms of generation of private returns to landowners and net social benefits (private returns plus ecosystem service value). Returns to landowners are highest in a scenario with large-scale agricultural expansion. This scenario, however, generated the lowest net social benefits across all scenarios considered because of large losses in stored carbon and negative impacts on water quality. Further, this scenario resulted in the largest decline in habitat quality for general terrestrial biodiversity and forest songbirds. Our results illustrate the importance of taking ecosystem services into account in land-use and land-management decision-making and linking such decisions to incentives that accurately reflect social returns.     

Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses

We consider the problem of dividing a resource among a group of agents who have conflicting claims on it. We follow the axiomatic approach and investigate the class of rules satisfying claims-inequality and claims-order preservation in gains and losses. We show that these axioms single out the proportional rule when there are more than three agents. This result confirms the central role of this rule and furthers our understanding of it in claims problems.     

Estimating switching costs after introducing Fixed-Mobile Convergence in Japan

In this study, based on a conjoint-type survey analysis, the switching cost of several Japanese telecom services are empirically examined simultaneously, contingent on each carrier’s bundling strategies. The results suggest the following conclusions. The hierarchy of switching costs is mobile phone service, fixed phone service, ISP (Internet Service Provider), and broadband access service, in descending order. Even if the government prohibits the formerly state-owned monopoly NTT from forming alliances with other carriers, the legacy NTT group would still command more than half of the market share under FMC if each carrier adopts a pure bundling strategy. If mixed bundling emerges as the primary strategy in the FMC market, the resulting type of competition from the introduction of FMC does not stimulate competitive pricing.     

Strategic niche management: towards a policy tool for sustainable development

Strategic niche management (SNM) is a recently developed approach that could help induce a broad socio-technical transition towards more sustainable development. It is designed to facilitate the introduction and diffusion of new sustainable technologies through protected societal experiments in fields such wind energy, biogas, public transport systems, electric vehicle transport and eco-friendly food production. A major challenge in SNM concerns the processes by which such experiments can evolve into viable market niches and ultimately contribute to a broader shift towards sustainable development. This paper sheds more light on this issue by systematically consolidating the main SNM studies, and by bringing in new insights from the literature that is in some sense complementary to SNM. These are studies on the development and commercialisation of radical innovations in large companies, and literature about infant industry protection and broader industrialisation processes in developing countries. A number of suggestions for implementing SNM are given.     

Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist

We show that a monopolistic final goods producer may find it profitable to create competition by licensing its technology if the input market is imperfectly competitive. With a centralized union, we show that licensing by a monopolist is profitable under both uniform and discriminatory wage settings by the union. However, the incentive for licensing is higher under the former situation. We also show that licensing by the monopolist is profitable under both quantity and price competition, and the incentive for licensing is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Our qualitative results hold even with decentralized unions.      

THE DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS ON PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS

This paper presents a classification of the different new Phillips curves existing in the literature as a set of choices based on three assumptions: the choice of the structure of price adjustments (Calvo or Taylor), the presence of backward indexation and the type of price contracts (fixed prices or predetermined prices). The paper suggests study of the dynamic properties of each specification, following different monetary shocks on the growth rate of the money stock. We develop the analytical form of the price dynamics, and we display graphics for the responses of prices, output and inflation. We show that the choice made for each of the three assumptions has a strong influence on the dynamic properties. Notably, the choice of the price structure, while often considered as unimportant, is indeed the most influential choice concerning the dynamic responses of output and inflation.     

An international comparison of the determinants of retail gross margins

In this paper we compare the results of applying a new economic framework for the analysis of retail gross margins to 1982 interindustry retail data for France, Germany, and the U.S. Use of the same theoretical framework and econometric methodology separately for each of the three bodies of data yields robust empirical regularities with respect to functional form and the role of distribution services in explaining retail gross margins. An interesting feature of these results is that they arise despite substantial differences in classification and in the retail environment of the three countries.We thank E. Hoffnar and P. MacNeill for excellent research assistance. We acknowledge the financial support of INSEAD's R&D department for project R2135. We also thank the CSC at Maryland for support. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the MIT Northeast Marketing Colloquium, the Simon Graduate School of Management at the University of Rochester, the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago, the Yale School of Organization and Management, the School of Business Administration at the University of Washington, and the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission. We thank the participants in these seminars for their constructive criticisms. We are especially indebted to Peter Rossi of the University of Chicago, who provided us with helpful written comments, and to Herr Krockow of the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, who provided us with unpublished data.     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.