Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size

We propose a theory of mergers that combines managerial merger motives with an industry-level regime shift that may lead to value-increasing merger opportunities. Anticipation of these merger opportunities can lead to defensive acquisitions, where managers acquire other firms to avoid losing private benefits if their firms are acquired, or positioning acquisitions, where firms position themselves as more attractive takeover targets to earn takeover premia. The identity of acquirers and targets and the profitability of acquisitions depend on the distribution of firm sizes within an industry, among other factors. We find empirical support for some unique predictions of our theory.     

Use of Product-Testing Organizations' Recommendations as a Strategy for Choice Simplification

A re-examination of survey data concerning the manner in which subscribers to Consumer Reports actually use the information presented in the magazine suggests that some subscribers simplify their decision making by following the brand recommendations provided. The results of a separate laboratory study with students as subjects provide additional evidence for the use of brand recommendations as part of a decision simplifying strategy. Implications of the findings for public policy are discussed.     

Agency,Delayed Compensation,and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long-run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.     

MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION

Despite widespread concern and discussion, no consensus exists concerning the causes of the "infrastructure crisis" or its implications for the efficiency of government decision-making more generally. We investigate several models of the determination of local public capital expenditures. Using Euler equation methods, we cannot reject the hypothesis that construction spending is determined by unconstrained, forward looking municipal planning. Consistent with this result, the stochastic structure of resource flows is an important feature of the determination of construction spending. Only unanticipated changes in a community's resources alter its demand for structures, with an unanticipated increase of one dollar increasing current construction spending by about 5.6 cents.