The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonprofit community increasing nervousness about Year 2000

Nonprofit organisations should consider six aspects of the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem: internal computer system failure, government computer system failure, global economy weakness, logic controller failure, financial institution disruption and fundraising disruptions. Seven suggestions are shared: buy only Y2K-compliant hardware and software, do not permit staff to install software from home, educate the board and staff and document planning efforts, designate someone to be responsible for Y2K efforts, make an inventory of at-risk hardware and software and query manufacturers, ensure that outsourced services are Y2K compliant and back up critical data. Seven useful Y2K World Wide Web resources for nonprofit organisations are reviewed. Copyright © 1999 Henry Stewart Publications     

Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment

We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Dealer Markets Under Stress: The Performance of NASDAQ Market Makers During the November 15, 1991, Market Break

The liquidity of the NASDAQ market was seriously undermined during the crash on October 19, 1987, when bid-ask spreads widened dramatically and dealers reputedly withdrew from market making. This paper studies the liquidity of 36 NASDAQ issues on November 15, 1991, when average prices fell over 4%, representing the first major correction in the post-crash era. We find that bid-ask spreads, the percentage of dealers posting inside quotes, and trading volume remained virtually unaffected. Effective spreads were also largely unaffected, except for trades in excess of 1,000 shares among issues whose market makers avoided odd-eighth quotes. Our evidence implies that, unlike October 1987, the liquidity of the NASDAQ market did not deteriorate appreciably during this episode of unusual market stress.     

喂饱世界八招

全球人口继续增长，可耕种土地却越来越少。科学家预计，到2050年，粮食产量必须增长一倍才能满足90亿人口需要。面对沉重压力，他们开始计划第二次绿色革命，寻找喂饱世界的办法。     

The Payoff to America from Globalisation

This article summarizes the economic payoff to the United States from its postwar trade opening and estimates the potential future gains from more opening going forward. To quantify these gains, we survey different methodologies and estimates. We find that trade opening since World War II has added between $800 billion to $1.4 trillion to the US economy, or about $7,000 to $13,000 per household. More speculative estimates of the potential additional gains from removing the rest of US trade barriers range from $400 billion to $1.3 trillion, or about $4,000 to $12,000 per household. Since trade opening permanently raises national income, these gains are enjoyed annually. Trade opening inevitably entails adjustment costs. We estimate that the lifetime cost of all worker dislocations that have been triggered by expanded trade in the United States could be as high as $54 billion, although probably less. The permanent gains from past and potential liberalization easily swamp the modest sums necessary to alleviate the temporary pains of adjustment. In the future as in the past, free trade can significantly raise income – and quality of life – in America.     

Ethics Programs in Global Businesses: Culture's Role in Managing Ethics

Even if there were widespread cross-cultural agreement on the normative issues of business ethics, corporate ethics management initiatives (e.g., codes of conduct, ethics telephone lines, ethics offices) which are appropriate in one cultural setting still could fail to mesh with the management practices and cultural characteristics of a different setting. By uncritically adopting widely promoted American practices for managing corporate ethics, multinational businesses risk failure in pursuing the ostensible goals of corporate ethics initiatives. Pursuing shared ethical goals by means of culturally inappropriate management practices, in short, can undermine the effectiveness of ethics management efforts. This article explicates how several important dimensions of culture can influence the effectiveness of common ethics initiatives, and recommends the development and application of a culture-structure contingency analysis in the task of encouraging ethical behavior in global businesses.