EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES

The notion that prices impound a wide array of information, including market expectations, has led to earnings forecast models conditioned on prices. Yet, presumably, analysts' forecasts capture both public information and certain private information not previously impounded in prices. Accordingly, price-based models are seemingly an inefficient, and less effective, source of expecta-tions. This article investigates this hypothesis using financial analysts', price-based, and naive forecasts. Results indicate that analysts' forecasts (1) are at least as accurate as price-based and naive models, and (2) yield better expectations for market tests relating returns and earnings. These inferences are robust across different information environments. The evidence suggests that analysts either possess private information or are more effective information processors, or both.     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.     

HEDGING INTEREST RATE RISK UNDER TERM STRUCTURE EFFECTS: AN APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In this paper we investigate the use of the structured full rank model for hedging the balance sheet of a financial institution. Simulation results suggest that the optimal hedge is insensitive to changes in parameter estimates. In addition, we hedge a portfolio of Treasury bills using both the full information covariance matrix and the structured covariance matrix. We then contrast these results with those obtained from a duration-based model. Empirical results suggest that the structured full rank model is generally more effective in hedging applications than either the full information model or duration-based model.     

From Experience: Avoiding Marketing's Best-Of-The-Best Specification Trap

Too often companies fall into a trap when developing a list of performance specifications for a new product. Milton Rosenau calls this the best-of-the-best specification trap. The problem arises whenever a company bases a specification on the combination of the best single features observed in available competitive products. When this happens, the new product's design is driven by competition and is not derived from a unique market insight. This may not provide the basis for a sustainable advantage. Sometimes, rumors of competitive improvements may even lead to sudden changes in the specification, creating delays in the development process. A far better goal is to develop a specification that responds to an unrecognized and unfilled user need, one that adds high value to users. His points are illustrated with several examples.     

The evaluation stage in marketing decision making

Prior to making important decisions, marketing managers go through an evaluation process in which available alternatives are compared. Yet, no systematic discussion of the evaluation process exists in the marketing literature. This article reviews the marketing and behavioral decision theory literature in order to identify factors that may cause errors in the two fundamental elements of the evaluation process—the estimation of probabilities and the determination of the value of outcomes. Propositions are developed that specify circumstances in which marketing management decisions may be influenced by judgmental biases, and procedures are identified for debiasing such judgments.     

The composition of interest: The judaic prohibition

An interest charge is made up of an award for waiting known as the real rate of interest, a premium for risk and compensation for transaction costs. Where inflation exists the lender seeks further compensation. In order to understand the composition and evolution of different versions of the usury prohibition it is necessary to ask which components of an interest charge are prohibited by each version. The Judaic prohibition has two aspects which are of particular interest to business historians and students of usury. First, the general rule is that a reward for waiting is prohibited. This focuses on the time-based part of interest charge. Second, interest is prohibited because it amounts to placing a stumbling block before the blind. This focuses on the typical gullibility of the borrower confronted by a more expert, better funded lender. Economics confirms and enriches our understanding of these important aspects of the prohibition. They achieve this by increasing our understanding of two facts: first, that the borrower is a gullible individual subject to irrational and inconsistent behaviour; and, second, that this behaviour relates to the waiting aspect of interest which is proscribed in the prohibition. How far these insights apply to other civilisations' prohibition, particularly those which derive from the Judaic prohibition, merits further study; so also do the ethical lessons of the Mosaic rules for a globalised society based on capitalism.