Varietal Licensing Standards and Canadian Wheat Exports

Canada's wheat grading system is largely based on visual criteria and it is based on relatively high quality standards. A strict varieties licensing system exists to maintain the integrity of the grade standards. One of the consequences of the licensing system is that higher yielding, lower or different quality wheats have not been grown in Canada until recently. The basic objective of this paper is to examine some of the consequences of the regulatory strategy of limiting wheat production to the traditional high quality wheats. This question is analyzed in the context of important changes in the international grain markets. Using a partial equilibrium trade model this paper estimates that if higher yielding wheats were permitted to be grown, annual producer gains would be 5 to 17 percent of current net farm income.
Le classement des blés au Canada est basé sur des critères visuels qui sont de hautes qualités. Le système actuel d'homologation des variétés est tel que l'intégrité de ce système est maintenue. En conséquent, ce système n'a pas encouragé la cultivation des blés de hauts rendements ou des varietés différentes que tout récemment. L'objectif principal de cette étude est d'examiner quelques unes des conséquences de la stratégic de la réglementation visant à limiter la production du blé aux variétés de hautes qualités. Cette question est adressée dans le contexte des changements importants qui ont eu lieu dans le marché international des grains. A l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel des échanges, la présente étude démontre gu'en permettant la production des blés de hauts rendements, le gain annuel aux producteurs serait de 5 à 17 pourcent du revenue agricole net.     

Cardinality-based equality of opportunities

We study possible rankings of opportunity profiles. An opportunity profile is a list of opportunity sets, one for each agent in the society. We compare profiles on the basis of the notion of “equality of opportunities”. Our main results show the necessary and sufficient conditions for this comparison to be made using exclusively the information provided by two cardinal measures: the number of common alternatives in all sets of a given profile and the difference between the number of alternatives in the individual sets. We also show that, under additional axioms, we can combine these criteria only in a weighted procedure or in some lexicographic refinements of a weighted procedure.      

Bank Monitoring and Environmental Risk

Abstract:  Loan announcement effects for 152 Canadian companies are examined to investigate the efficiency of monitoring by banks facing lender environmental liability. Market reaction to the announcement of bank debt to 'environmental' firms is more positive and significant than for 'non-environmental' firms and, for firms in industries with a higher likelihood of experiencing spill events, is more positive and significant, reinforcing earlier results that establish a relationship between specific loan/borrower characteristics and announcement period excess returns and providing further evidence on the 'uniqueness' of bank loans by demonstrating the superior ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers exposed to environmental liability.