Antecedents and outcomes of bifurcated compensation in family firms: A multilevel view

Through a multilevel view, this article challenges the dominant assumption in the literature suggesting that family employees will receive more compensation than their non-family peers, which will violate the latter group justice perceptions and will lead them to lower their inputs to retrieve equity. We start by discussing how competing socioemotional priorities combine with the degree of collectivism at the societal level to affect which group will bifurcated compensation favor. We suggest that embeddedness in a collectivist culture will generate a strong desire and a moral obligation to cater to the financial well-being of family members, hence leading to bifurcated compensation favoring family employees. In individualist cultures, however, the family will accord high importance to achieving family prominence, which leads to bifurcated compensation favoring non-family employees. Moving forward, we discuss how nepotism types shape the effect of bifurcated compensation on the under-privileged group work inputs and how this relationship is moderated by the extent of power distance embedded in society. Theoretical and empirical implications are discussed at the end of the paper.     

The impact of prudence on optimal prevention revisited

We re-examine the link between absolute prudence and self-protection activities. We show that the level of effort chosen by an agent with decreasing absolute prudence is larger than the optimal effort chosen by a risk-neutral agent if the degree of absolute prudence is less than a threshold that is utility-independent and empirically verifiable.     

Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game

We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.     

Arbitrage costs and nonlinear adjustment in the G7 stock markets

This article aims to study stock price adjustments towards fundamentals due to the existence of arbitrage costs defined as the sum of transaction costs and a risky arbitrage premium associated with the uncertainty characterizing the fundamentals. Accordingly, it is shown that a two regime Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (STECM) is appropriate to reproduce the dynamics of stock price deviations from fundamentals in the G7 countries during the period 1969 to 2005. This model takes into account the interdependences or contagion effects between stock markets. Deviations appear to follow a quasi random walk in the central regime when prices are near fundamentals (i.e. when arbitrage costs are greater than expected arbitrage profits, the mean reversion mechanism is inactive), while they approach a white noise in the outer regimes (i.e. when arbitrage costs are lower than expected arbitrage profits, the mean reversion is active). Interestingly, as expected when arbitrage costs are heterogeneous, the estimated STECM shows that stock price adjustments are smooth and that the convergence speed depends on the size of the deviation. Finally, using two appropriate indicators proposed by Peel and Taylor (2000), both the magnitudes of under and overvaluation of stock price and the adjustment speed are calculated per date in the G7 countries. These indicators show that the dynamics of stock price adjustment are strongly dependent on both the date and the country under consideration.     

A Balanced Concept of the Firm and the Measurement of Its Long-term Planning and Performance

This paper offers a new concept of the firm that aims at balancing the corporate economic, social, and environmental responsibilities and goes beyond the stakeholder approach. It intends to provide a conceptual and operationalizable basis to fairly assess corporate conduct from both inside and outside the companies. To a large extent these different responsibilities may overlap and reinforce each other. However, if they conflict, they should be clearly evaluated for their own sake and in terms of wealth creation. Only then can a balanced approach be realized. Section 1 briefly discusses some general aspects of the relationship between concepts and measurement. In Section 2, a concept of the firm is developed that is based on the notion of responsibility and balances economic, social and environmental responsibilities. According to these concepts, different ways of measuring corporate planning and performance are examined in Section 3, followed up by a summary and conclusions.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Which business model for e-book pricing?

We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second scenario, the players use a revenue-sharing contract for only the digital version, while the competing version is managed by a wholesale price contract. The problem is inspired from a pricing controversy in the e-book industry.     

Demographic Dividends in the ‘South’, Ageing ‘North’, and ‘South-South’ Trade Diversification

The absence of clear convergence in incomes per capita and welfare between the North and the South, even in the face of spectacular growth rates in GDP in the emerging South, might be due to a terms of trade deterioration resulting from an expansion of production in the South which depresses the product’s price on world markets. This may originate from a “technical catch up” and also from a “demographic dividend” in the South relative to an ageing North. This article illustrates that some South-South trade diversification might mitigate the terms of trade deterioration and increase welfare gains in the South. We use a multicountry overlapping-generation general equilibrium model to simulate the magnitude of the terms of trade effect due to a demographic dividend in Turkey, and show that some trade diversification away from EU toward the South is a welfare improving policy for Turkey.