The making of the German minimum wage: a case study of institutional change

In the more recent dualistic theories, Germany is cited as an example of a less solidaristic equilibrium, in which ‘producer coalitions’ between core workforces supposedly unaffected by deregulation and their employers prevented the introduction of a minimum wage. The present article shows that such an equilibrium never existed. Core workforces are being threatened by the outsourcing of jobs to the low‐wage sector. This threat created the breeding ground for a joint campaign by manufacturing and service unions for a minimum wage, which made it possible to amalgamate the unions' considerable resources at company level, their strength being derived from the German system of codetermination. Under pressure from the manufacturing unions in particular, the arrangements for the minimum wage follow, as far as possible, the traditions of free collective bargaining. As a result, the social partners in Germany have a considerably stronger influence on the minimum wage than those in the UK.     

Implementing a Stochastic Bioeconomic Model for the North-East Arctic Cod Fishery

In this paper, we study how a stochastic model can be used to determine optimal levels of exploitation of the North-East Arctic Cod (NEAC, Gadus morhua). A non-critical depensation growth model is developed for this species in order to examine both deterministic and stochastic cases. Estimation of the biological and the noise term parameters in the stochastic biomass dynamics is based on simulation and use of empirical NEAC data sets for the years 1985–2001. The Kolmogorov– Smirnov criterion-based method is used to estimate both drift and diffusion parameters simultaneously. The estimates turn out to be reasonable and the model is able to capture the salient features of the NEAC dynamics. The model is used to derive optimal levels of exploitation with different diffusion functions in the stochastic case and various discount rates in the deterministic case. Optimal catches are compared to the historical catch records. A striking feature of our modeling results is that these records fit surprisingly well with the infinite discounting tracks, i.e., the bliss solution. Our general results indicate that over fishing has resulted from lack of long-term planning as well as inadequate response to uncertainty.     

Policy rule Nash equilibria

Abstract.  We study how different types of instrument rules affect the outcome of a monetary policy game between the central bank and the private sector. Policy rules can be independent of output and a shock, functions of the shock, or functions of output. We rank the Nash equilibria generated by different types of policy rules according to the central bank's ex ante expected loss. If both players can condition on output, then the following is true: no equilibrium exists if the central bank cares much about output stability and little about price stability, and infinitely many equilibria exist otherwise. JEL classification: E52, E61
Equilibres à la Nash des règles de politique.  L'auteur étudie comment le choix de divers types de règles instrumentales a un effet sur le résultat d'un jeu de politique monétaire entre la banque centrale et le secteur privé. Les règles de politique peuvent être indépendantes de la production ou d'un choc, être fonction d'un choc ou de la production. On établit un ordre des équilibres à la Nash engendrés par ces divers types de règles de politique selon la taille des pertes anticipées ex ante par la banque centrale. Si les deux joueurs fondent leur comportement sur la production, il s'ensuit que — aucun équilibre n'existe si la banque centrale est très préoccupée par la stabilité du niveau de production et peu préoccupée de la stabilité des prix, et autrement, une infinité d'équilibres existent.