Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

An agent-based model of innovation diffusion: network structure and coexistence under different information regimes

The paper analyzes how the structure of social networks affects innovation diffusion and competition under different information regimes. Diffusion is modeled as the result of idiosyncratic adoption thresholds, local network effects and information diffusion (broadcasting and demonstration effect from previous adopters). A high social cohesion decreases the probability of one innovation cornering the market. Nonetheless, with imperfect information, in small-world networks the higher speed of diffusion produced by the low average distance increases this probability. A low social cohesion also increases the probability of falling into traps of under-adoption. However, such probability is significantly lower with imperfect information, because such regime is characterized by higher levels of market concentrations and this reduces the frictions due to the coexistence of non-compatible product innovations.     

Did immigration contribute to wage stagnation of unskilled workers?

In this paper we first show that the timing and skill distribution of Immigrants to the U.S. between 1970 and 2014 imply they did not contribute to the decline in the wages of native, non-college educated workers – including high school dropouts – at the national level. We then review other evidence at the local level, which implies immigration is not associated with lower non-college wages. Rather, higher immigration seems associated with higher average (and college-level) wages. Local externalities, complementarities, efficient specialization and appropriate technological choice suggest at least part of the positive association is causal.     

A search model for Joint Implementation

The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the field of environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a series of interesting results and useful insights, and is conveniently used here as a framework to explain the functioning of Joint Implementation programs for polluting emissions＇ reduction.     

Non-market valuation of forest goods and services: Good practice guidelines

The European COST Action E45 on European Forest Externalities (EUROFOREX) participants developed a set of good practice guidelines for the non-market valuation of forests, elaborating on stated and revealed preference methodologies, as well as benefit transfer and meta-analytical procedures. This article presents a summary of the guidelines.     

Euro vs Dollar: An Improbable Threat

Ever since the setting up of the EMU, many scholars have argued that the Euro will take its place alongside the dollar and perhaps even replace it as international money. The theory behind this point of view is represented by search-theoretic models. The fundamental shortcoming of the traditional version of these models is that they fail to make a distinction between different types of money, in particular between commodity money and fiduciary money. In the international context a fiduciary money can be accepted only when a political exchange is possible between a leading country which has an interest in producing trust in the future value of its currency and other countries which attach no importance to the relative gains the issuing country acquires by exploiting the privilege of seigniorage. The Bretton Woods system and the dollar standard, although based on fiduciary monies, have worked thanks to the institutional framework maintained by the United States and accepted by other countries. Unlike the United States, the euro area is not in a position to exercise any form of political leadership on the international scene. As things stand the euro does not represent a threat to the dollar and it is bound to remain a regional money.