Kapitalprivatisierung der Deutschen Bahn AG

Die geplante materielle Privatisierung der Deutschen Bahn AG kann als logischer Schritt der formalen Bahnprivatisierung vom 1.1.1994 angesehen werden. Welche Privatisierungsmodelle werden gegenw?rtig diskutiert? Sollte die Deutsche Bahn AG mit oder ohne ihr Betriebsnetz an die B?rse gehen? Ist die Deutsche Bahn AG überhaupt b?rsenf?hig?     

Immediate Annuity Pricing in the Presence of Unobserved Heterogeneity

Abstract

One of the acknowledged difficulties with pricing immediate annuities is that underwriting the annuitantis life is the exception rather than the rule. In the absence of underwriting, the price paid for a life-contingent annuity is the same for all sales at a given age. This exposes the market (insurance company and potential policyholder alike) to antiselection. The insurance company worries that only the healthiest people choose a life-contingent annuity and therefore adjust mortality accordingly. The potential policyholders worry that they are not being compensated for their relatively poor health and choose not to purchase what would otherwise be a very beneficial product.

This paper develops a model of underlying, unobserved health. Health is a state variable that follows a first-order Markov process. An individual reaches the state “death” either by accident from any health state or by progressively declining health state. Health state is one-dimensional, in the sense that health can either “improve” or “deteriorate” by moving farther from or close to the “death” state, respectively. The probability of death in a given year is a function of health state, not of age. Therefore, in this model a person is exactly as old as he or she feels.

I first demonstrate that a multistate, ageless Markov model can match the mortality patterns in the common annuity mortality tables. The model is extended to consider several types of mortality improvements: permanent through decreasing probability of deteriorating health, temporary through improved distribution of initial health state, and plateau through the effects of past health improvements.

I then construct an economic model of optimal policyholder behavior, assuming that the policyholder either knows his or her health state or has some limited information. the value of mortality risk transfer through purchasing a life-contingent annuity is estimated for each health state under various risk-aversion parameters. Given the economic model for optimal purchasing of annuities, the value of underwriting (limited information about policyholder health state) is demonstrated.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

Asia-Pacific Economies: Challenges Along the Road from Self Reliance to Global Engagement

This review article makes a contribution to understanding the current U.S. subprime mortgage and credit crisis that has adversely affected the global financial system in terms of its historical parallels with a recent Asia-Pacific financial crisis. It also looks at the distinctive ways in which bad actors and flawed processes at the macro-, meso-, and microlevels have unilaterally shifted risks onto innocent stakeholders and are now facing a time of global reckoning and reform. An alternative business model, the global business integrity capacity model (GBICM), is proposed that inclusively balances types of capitalist, moral accountability, and human nature theories and provides a framework for selected reforms at the macro-, meso-, and microlevels, which are designed to prevent a recurrence of the current financial meltdown, to re-create systemic financial institution integrity, and to promote sustainable prosperity for current and future generations.     

中国金融市场信用风险模型研究与应用

文章运用中国金融市场和原银行信贷登记系统数据及人民银行组织的信用评级等数据资源,在金融工程理论和技术方法创新的基础上,借鉴国际信用风险模型中违约模式代表——KMV模型原理,实证建立由判别函数和违约强度共同构成的中国金融市场违约预警模型;借鉴国际信用风险模型中盯市模式代表——CreditMetrics模型原理,使用蒙特卡罗模拟方法实证建立中国金融市场信用组合计量模型;探索这两类模型在中国信贷市场、外汇市场、货币市场和债券市场风险管理实务中的应用;并在此基础上提出了政策性建议。