EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: POLICY AND MEASUREMENT PARADIGMS

Abstract Equality of opportunity is a widely accepted principle of distributive justice and it is the leading idea of most political platforms in several countries. According to this principle, a society might institute policies that secure an equal distribution of the means to reach a valuable outcome among its members. Once the set of opportunities have been equalized, which particular opportunity, the individual chooses from those open to her, is outside the scope of justice. Ex ante inequalities, and only those inequalities, should be eliminated or compensated for by public intervention. The recent literature on the opportunity egalitarianism often merges these questions introducing two different economic issues. On one side the design of a public policy intended to implement the equality of opportunity view and on the other side the problem of measuring the degree of opportunity inequality in a society. We describe the basic setting and assumptions of some different approaches derived by Roemer’s algorithm for public policy and then we discuss some theoretical and empirical studies to separate and test alternative paradigms on the measurement of inequality of opportunity. Accordingly, an extended critique on the causality issue on policies and measurements is taken into account.     

A customer’s utility measure based on the reliability of multi-state systems

The main focus of this paper is on the development of utility measures for dynamic multi-state systems that have M + 1 discrete states of working efficiency. To develop the utility measures for multi-state systems, we assume that the degradation of the multi-state systems follows a non-homogeneous semi-Markov process together with a backward recurrence time process and that the system can directly degrade into any lower state. The measure considers the immediate utility derived from the state of the system occupancy and the utility due to the system survival expectations derived from its reliability. Moreover, in order to measure the customer’s cumulative utility, the discounted non-homogeneous continuous time semi-Markov process with rewards is implemented. In such a way, the higher order moments of the reward process can be evaluated and then, in particular, the expectation and the standard deviation of the consumer’s accumulated discounted utility. These statistic indices are useful both to the industry in order to compare different system designs offered by the market and to the market itself, in order to know the customer’s utility deriving from the goods she/he consumes. Finally, a numerical example shows the possibility of implementing the model in real-life problems.     

Asymmetric information and deal selection: evidence from the Italian venture capital market

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - The aim of this study is to show how information asymmetry affects the venture capital (VC) deal selection process in the Italian capital...     

Is the 2008 financial turmoil increasing the risk of a bank run？ An empirical research in Geneva

In this paper, the authors present the results of an empirical study that attempts to analyse the risk of bank run in Geneva, Switzerland. Two similar surveys have been conducted upon two independent samples of Geneva population （June 2008 and February 2009） to detect the existence of predictive signals leading to a bank run within the selected area. The authors discover that Geneva inhabitants are generally confident in Swiss banks; the risk of a bank run in the area is low. However, reliance to the national banking system is worsening： The number of people fearing about their savings and those thinking the default of a major Swiss bank as ＂possible＂ has significantly risen. Also, more and more people keep updated about the current financial crisis; overall trust in Swiss banks has slightly decreased.     

CSR and service quality in nonprofit organizations: the case of a performing arts association

• The relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and marketing performance has been widely investigated recently, but mostly in relation to for-profit companies. This paper highlights the importance of this topic for nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Focusing on an Italian NPO operating in the performing arts and entertainment industry, two empirical studies (a quantitative survey and a qualitative exploratory enquiry) prove the strategic relevance of CSR in nonprofit contexts. The results demonstrate that CSR can be considered an additional dimension of the customer perception of service quality in NPOs and reveal that customer perception of the social responsibility of the studied NPO is strongly linked to its institutional mission and to the modalities through which it pursues that mission.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A note on contribution games with loss functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.     

Hicks on monetary theory and history: money as endogenous money

Hicks was never tired of saying that monetary theory is in history.What he meant was that monetary theory is intrinsically relatedto real events, and more importantly that monetary issues needto be analysed in a dynamic sequential context in which timeplays an essential part. He went on developing a particularsequential analysis: the study of what happens within a singleperiod (‘single-period theory’) and the study ofthe linkages between a succession of those periods (‘continuationtheory’). It is suggested that this distinction providesa useful lesson for modern endogenous money theorists.     

Can price regulation increase cost-efficiency?

This paper examines the possibility that price regulation increases a monopolist's cost-efficiency. When the firm's choice of cost-reducing effort depends on the output supplied, a binding price-cap, by compelling the monopolist to produce more, results in lower costs. On the basis of a two-period asymmetric information model, the paper demonstrates that price regulation increases efficiency when the elasticity of demand is sufficiently low, even assuming very conservative preferences of the regulator and asymmetric information. Moreover, contrary to previous findings and conventional wisdom, we find that a periodical rate base review may increase productive efficiency through the positive effect on future cost-reducing effort, counterbalancing its well known adverse effect on the current level of effort.