Can price regulation increase cost-efficiency?

This paper examines the possibility that price regulation increases a monopolist's cost-efficiency. When the firm's choice of cost-reducing effort depends on the output supplied, a binding price-cap, by compelling the monopolist to produce more, results in lower costs. On the basis of a two-period asymmetric information model, the paper demonstrates that price regulation increases efficiency when the elasticity of demand is sufficiently low, even assuming very conservative preferences of the regulator and asymmetric information. Moreover, contrary to previous findings and conventional wisdom, we find that a periodical rate base review may increase productive efficiency through the positive effect on future cost-reducing effort, counterbalancing its well known adverse effect on the current level of effort.     

A social contract approach to sustainability

This paper asks whether it is possible to derive a concern for future generations (“sustainability”) from an account of the firm as a social contract (SC) among its stakeholders. Two aspects of a leading SC model of the firm limit its usefulness for an analysis of sustainability. First, the stakeholders provide investments to the firm over time. Second, the relationship between contemporaries and future generations is marked by asymmetries of power and knowledge that need to be considered while reconstructing the SC today. I discuss three reformulations of the SC that are all, in principle, capable of introducing within the SC a concern for future generations. The first describes the contractors as heads of families. The second envisages a grand meeting of stakeholders of all generations. The third, which I find most defensible, views the SC as an ahistorical agreement reached behind a thick veil of ignorance. This agreement is based on John Rawls’s norm of reciprocity, whereby the stakeholders adopt today the decision they wish all previous (and future) generations had made regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and emission of pollutants.     

Home bias in divestment decisions of multinational corporations in the EU

We empirically investigate the claim that multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from a “home bias” in divestment decisions: MNCs prefer to divest from foreign subsidiaries because the “emotional involvement” and the commitment in divesting from domestic subsidiaries is larger. This issue has not been yet empirically explored in the economic literature, although it is quite recurrent in the political debate on MNCs and FDI. Using detailed company‐level data on the EU corporate groups during the economic crisis (2008–2014), we show that, in spite of prima facie empirical evidence of a home bias, the bias disappears when firm‐, country‐, and sector‐specific factors are accounted for.     

A note on contribution games with loss functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.     

Asymmetric information and deal selection: evidence from the Italian venture capital market

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - The aim of this study is to show how information asymmetry affects the venture capital (VC) deal selection process in the Italian capital...     

Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard

This paper presents a principal-agent model in which the agent has imprecise beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent?s preferences are incomplete as in Bewley (1986) [2]. In this setting, incentives must be robust to Knightian uncertainty. We study the implications of robustness for the form of the resulting optimal contracts. We give conditions under which there is a unique optimal contract, and show that it must have a simple flat payment plus bonus structure. That is, output levels are divided into two sets, and the optimal contract pays the same wage for all output levels in each set. We derive this result for the case in which the agent?s utility function is linear and then show it also holds if this utility function has some limited curvature.     

THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS OF THE SIMPLE RICARDIAN SYSTEM: A NOTE

In a recent note, Bhaduri and Harris (1987) showed that a discrete-time dynamic version of the ‘simple’Ricardian system (i.e. Blaug's (1978) popular version of Kaldor's (1955-6) representation of Ricardian distribution theory, which includes linear agricultural productivity) can be endowed with an unstable stationary state, and that the system can also exhibit “chaotic” orbits (cfr. Collet and Eckmann, 1980), even if these phenomena cannot appear when the adjustment process is continuous. This stationary state does not necessarily have to be unstable. A slightly generalized version of the ‘simple’Ricardian system (we dispense with the linearity assumption) is used in this paper to analyse a number of meaningful special cases in which the stationary state is stable.     

Occupational and Job Mobility in the US*

We propose a new methodology to measure worker mobility across occupations and jobs in the US, building on the limited longitudinal dimension of monthly CPS data. For the period 1979–2006, we find that about 3.5% of male workers employed in two consecutive months report different three‐digit occupations. This rate is procyclical, mildly rising in the 1980s and falling after 1995. We also revise upward current estimates of aggregate job‐to‐job mobility since 1994, from 2.7% to 3.2% of employment per month. Despite extreme similarity of average levels and time‐series behavior, occupational and job mobility are only weakly correlated.