Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

This paper studies how communication is used by a retail gasoline cartel in Australia to coordinate price increases, a role of communication in collusion not highlighted by Genesove and Mullin (Am Econ Rev 91(3): 379–398, 2001). A unique data set from the trial record allows for quantifying not only the pricing dynamics, but also the communication patterns. Both empirical and narrative evidence suggests the collusive communication and pricing behavior is well captured by the price cycle equilibrium of the Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56(3): 571–599, 1988) model.     

Useful measures in the field of time and dimensional rationalisation of manual training lessons

Schoolwork, especially lessons in manual skills is often associated with various ergonomics stresses. These stresses are the result not only of school obligations but also of the physical working environment and inadequate lesson planning. Much can be done in this field if certain approaches are taken into consideration at the work planning stage. Thus we can use certain analytical methods, such as the Method of Temporary Observations (Multi-Moment Method) and OWAS (a method for the evaluation of postural load during work), when positioning stressful lesson factors. This can be done in a relatively simple way in the field of time rationalisation as well as in the field of dimensional work adjustment to pupils. Research results in this paper show that by using a planned directed approach in this field, it is possible to achieve, a higher level of efficiency with normal levels of fatigue.     

Is abusive supervision an absolute devil? Literature review and research agenda

Abusive supervision has received increasing attention in the field. However, few studies have qualitatively reviewed its latest developments. The current paper reviews 48 studies on abusive supervision using content analysis. We identify six emerging trends of abusive supervision, including inconsistency of abusive behaviors, comparison between perceived and objective behaviors, reciprocity, team-level climate, coworker effects, and comparisons between theoretical perspectives. Based on a review of those six trends and some emerging findings, we identify and validate the possible positive effects of abusive supervision from an integrated analysis. We also determine the moderating role that Asian culture plays in differentiating the negative and positive effects of abusive supervision. Specifically, we identify the differences between Asian and Western cultures, and then explore the moral mechanisms (i.e., violation of moral standards, conflict of moral principles) through which abusive supervision may exert positive effects in the Asian cultural context. Finally, we clarify our theoretical implications and provide suggestions for future research.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Guanxi</Emphasis> circle and organizational citizenship behavior: Context of a Chinese workplace

According to leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, good vertical working relations encourage organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) that benefits organizations. But how does supervisor-subordinate guanxi influence employees’ extra-role behaviors in relation to organizational interests? To answer this question, this paper examines a particular structural phenomenon in the context of the Chinese workplace. Guanxi circles (the phenomenon under investigation) are ego-centered guanxi networks with a powerful person at the center. Although a circle leader and his or her group members exchange favors for private goals, they need to actively balance their own interests with the interests of people/groups outside the guanxi circle; so as to maintain a harmonious relationship with the larger network. For this reason, extra-role performance benefiting the larger network is encouraged in the management of a guanxi circle. By studying survey data from China, we demonstrate how a wide variety of circle roles facilitate extra-role performance, and ultimately benefit the organization as a whole. Circle bridges have higher OCB toward organizations (OCB-O) than peripheral members of a circle, who in turn have higher OCB-O than core members of the same circle.     

Inter-market competition for NYSE-listed securities under decimals

Blume and Goldstein (J Finance 52:221–244, 1997) suggest that quote competition between trading venues may diminish following tick size reductions. We test this suggestion by studying the competitive landscape in the NYSE-listed stocks before and after decimalization. We find that NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer) participation by non-NYSE venues declines following decimalization consistent with the prediction. At the same time, the importance of quote competitiveness in attracting order flow increases. In addition, although not as active in determining and maintaining the best quotes under decimals, non-NYSE venues become more active in price discovery. Finally, decimalization leads to lower trading costs and to smaller differences in trading costs across trading venues.     

Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages

U.S. banking regulators have proposed a bifurcated system of capital regulation where the largest, internationally active banking organizations would be subject to significantly more risk sensitive regulatory capital requirements than are currently in place, while most others would remain subject to the current rules. The proposed new capital regime has the potential to affect the competitive landscape among banking institutions, particularly in the area of residential mortgage lending. We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed, bifurcated regulatory capital system on competition in the residential mortgage market from the perspective of the theory of regulatory capital arbitrage. We then apply the theory and available evidence to perform some benchmark calculations that suggest a significant, potential shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions in the mortgage market.

A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism

This paper proposes a model which examines the power of monitoring and forcing contract on improving managerial efficiency. We put particular focus on its implication regarding the choice of advisor type used by REITs. This question has long been a puzzling one in real estate literature. Our model provides a theoretical justification regarding the potential appeal of external managerial structure, which is usually regarded as being inferior to internal managerial structure. A crucial driving force regarding advisor choice is the heterogeneity on monitoring power between internal and external advisors and across REIT firms. Provided that the gap of monitoring power is large enough between internal and external advisors, shareholders could make use of the heterogeneity, and induce higher effort levels from external advisors. We motivate the rationale for expecting a “monitoring advantage” over external management from two aspects: the dual-role of external advisory firm and a bigger reputational cost associated with external advisor. Furthermore, we are able to specify the range within which an improved monitoring power is Pareto-optimal for both REIT shareholders and advisors. One implication is that, as agents, it may also be to the benefit of advisors to be better monitored. Finally, we compare the difference between fixed and stochastic forcing contracts. Our findings show that with their imperfect performance measures, the stochastic forcing contracts always dominate the fixed one.     

Securitization and Banks’ Equity Risk

This research explores the effects of securitization on the market’s perception of banks’ risk exposure between 2002 and 2007. Our results show that, contrary to some prior evidence in the literature, securitizing banks actually had lower systematic betas until 2007. We find no evidence of increasing idiosyncratic risk with securitization. We identify significant structural break in 2007, when securitizing banks experienced jumps in both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Finally, we confirm the general belief that larger banks tend to have higher systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk because of diversification.