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We investigate the profitability of contrarian investment strategies for equities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), which are separated into cross-listed firms and firms listed only in Hong Kong. We also investigate the relationship between stock returns and past trading volume for these equities. We report significantly higher contrarian profits for the period investigated and find that this is a persistent feature of stock returns for cross-listed companies. We also document that contrarian portfolios earn returns as high as 8.01% per month for the dually-traded companies and just 1.83% for only HKEX-listed firms. We find that volume has only a limited ability to explain contrarian profits. All extreme profits disappeared after adjusting for the Fama and French three-factor model.  相似文献   
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We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism.  相似文献   
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We study a two-echelon supply chain scheduling problem in which a manufacturer acquires supplies from an upstream supplier and processes orders from the downstream retailers. The supply chain sells a single short-life product in a single season. We consider the scenario where the manufacturer can only accept some of the orders from the retailers due to its supplier's common production time window and its own two common production and delivery time windows. The upstream supplier processes materials and delivers the semi-finished products to the manufacturer within its time window. Then the manufacturer further processes these products to produce finished products and delivers them to the retailers within its two time windows, where one window is for production and normal delivery, and the other is for production and express delivery. Having to store the materials before processing them, the supplier incurs a storage cost, which depends on the order size and storage time. The manufacturer pays the transportation cost for delivering the finished products to the retailers. Due to double marginalization, the performance of the supply chain is sub-optimal. We model the supply chain problem as a flow shop scheduling problem with multiple common time windows. We derive some dominance properties and establish some theorems that help solve the sequencing problems for the orders and eliminate the idle time among the orders. Based on these results, we develop fast pseudo-polynomial dynamic algorithms to optimally solve the problem. We prove that the problem is NP-hard in the ordinary sense only. We develop two practically relevant and robust methods for the supply chain to achieve optimal profit-making performance through channel coordination.  相似文献   
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