Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Non-compliance notifications and taxpayer strategic behavior: evidence from Ecuador

International Tax and Public Finance - This paper examines the effect of enforcement on taxpayer behavior using administrative data from Ecuador. To overcome confounding factors, a regression...     

The Impact of Membership in the Ethics Officer Association

In this study, we propose considering membership in the Ethics Officer Association (EOA) as a proxy for the firm's commitment to ethical decision making, and we analyze the influence of firm- and CEO-specific characteristics on this commitment. While we observe a positive relationship between membership and firm size, we also document a negative relationship between EOA membership and the executive's time in position and, to a more modest extent, accounting returns. Pursuing this further, we present evidence that firms with past legal issues may seek EOA membership as a signal of their intention to be compliant in the future.     

How to Spot a Careerist Early On: Psychopathy and Exchange Ideology as Predictors of Careerism

Careerism refers to an individual’s propensity to achieve their personal and career goals through nonperformance-based activities (Feldman, The Indus Org Psychol 39–44, 1985). We investigated the role of several dispositional predictors of careerism, including Five-factor model (FFM) personality traits, primary psychopathy, and exchange ideology. Based on data from 131 respondents, as expected, we observed that emotional stability was negatively correlated with careerism. Primary psychopathy and exchange ideology explained additional variance in careerism after accounting for FFM traits. Relative importance analyses indicated that psychopathy (relative weight percentage of explained variance = 42.1 %) and exchange ideology (relative weight percentage = 44.1 %) were equally important in predicting careerism. We highlight the need for future research efforts investigating the combined effects of contextual factors—particularly, human resource practices—and individual differences to understand careerism in the workplace.     

Do Extrinsic Incentives Undermine Social Norms? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Energy Conservation

Policymakers use both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to induce consumers to change behavior. This paper investigates whether the use of extrinsic financial incentives is complementary to intrinsic incentives, or whether financial incentives undermine the effect of intrinsic incentives. We conduct a randomized controlled trial that uses information interventions to residential electricity customers to test this question. We find that adding economic incentives to normative messages not only does not strengthen the effect of the latter but may reduce it. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work that suggests a tension between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives.     

The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

In this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.     

An N‐factor Gaussian model of oil futures prices

This article studies the ability of an N‐factor Gaussian model to explain the stochastic behavior of oil futures prices when estimated with the use of all available price information, as opposed to traditional approaches of aggregating data for a set of maturities. A Kalman filter estimation procedure that allows for a time‐dependent number of daily observations is used to calibrate the model. When applied to all daily oil futures price transactions from 1992 to 2001, the model performs very well, requiring at least three factors to explain the term structure of futures prices, but four factors to fit the volatility term structure. The model also performs very well for daily copper futures transactions from 1992 to 2001 and for out‐of‐sample daily oil futures transactions from 2002 to 2004. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:243–268, 2006     

A legal and economic study of the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 in Spain

The study conducts a legal and economic analysis comparing the new Consolidated Text of the Land Use Act of 2008 (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Suelo) and the Land Law 6/1998, April 13 now repealed. The study examines various articles contained in the new law and the old law. Although the study analyzes every title in both laws, it focuses on Title III regarding valuations for the expropriation of property owners.