Value‐Chains in the Andes: Upgrading for Ecuador's Blackberry Producers

We apply a value chain approach to examine how blackberry producers in Ecuador can improve production and marketing practices to obtain more favorable prices. Results show that general upgrading actions are associated with improved producer prices, and specific activities, such as seeking information from reputable sources can lead to substantial welfare improvements. The paper goes beyond most value chain studies which treat participation in a ‘modern’ value chain as a discrete state. Ecuador's blackberry industry is evolving incrementally with no clearly discernible ‘modern’ market chains. Instead, producers incrementally make improvements in multiple dimensions. Relatively low‐cost practices, many of which do not imply substantial risk or investment, are associated with price improvements. Obstacles to participation in incremental value chain upgrading activities are not insurmountable. In particular, scale of production is not a limiting factor: small‐scale producers are not precluded from adopting improved practices and they do not suffer in terms of price received.     

Evolución de la capacidad tecnológica en México. Aplicación del análisis estadístico multivariante de cluster

This paper conducts an analysis on the existence of state clusters related with technological capabilities in Mexico. An empirical study was conducted using the technique of multivariate statistical cluster analysis, based on the set of indicators proposed by Cepal (2007), collecting data from various public sources country for 2006 and 2012 in order to study the time evolution of such clusters, trying to see what states have been moving to a cluster located in positions more which have advanced and retreated over the period. The results show the existence of 7 groups of states characterized by different technological capabilities, plus states are identified in decline and progress, both in terms of absorptive capacity and innovation, and in relation to the technological infrastructure capabilities.     

MARKETS AND GAMES: A SIMPLE EQUIVALENCE AMONG THE CORE,EQUILIBRIUM AND LIMITED ARBITRAGE

This note provides simple proofs of the equivalence among the core, equilibrium and limited arbitrage in markets with short sales, and with uniform strictly convex preferences.     

The topology of fear

For many years experimental observations have raised questions about the rationality of economic agents—for example, the Allais Paradox or the Equity Premium Puzzle. The problem is a narrow notion of rationality that disregards fear. This article extends the notion of rationality with new axioms of choice under uncertainty and the decision criteria they imply (Chichilnisky, G., 1996a. An axiomatic approach to sustainable development. Social Choice andWelfare 13, 257–321; Chichilnisky, G., 2000. An axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty with Catastrophic risks. Resource and Energy Economics; Chichilnisky, G., 2002. Catastrophical Risk. Encyclopedia of Environmetrics, vol. 1. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chicester). In the absence of catastrophes, the old and the new approach coincide, and both lead to standard expected utility. A sharp difference emerges when facing rare events with important consequences, or catastrophes. Theorem 1 establishes that a classic axiom of choice under uncertainty – Arrow’s Monotone Continuity axiom, or its relatives introduced by DeGroot, Villegas, Hernstein and Milnor – postulate rational behavior that is ‘insensitive’ to rare events as defined in (Chichilnisky, G., 1996a. An axiomatic approach to sustainable development. Social Choice andWelfare 13, 257–321; Chichilnisky, G., 2000. An axiomatic approach to choice under uncertainty with Catastrophic risks. Resource and Energy Economics; Chichilnisky, G., 2002. Catastrophical Risk. Encyclopedia of Environmetrics, vol. 1. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Chicester). Theorem 2 replaces this axiom with another that allows extreme responses to extreme events, and characterizes the implied decision criteria as a combination of expected utility with extremal responses. Theorems 1 and 2 offer a new understanding of rationality consistent with previously unexplained observations about decisions involving rare and catastrophic events, decisions involving fear, the Equity Premium Puzzle, ‘jump diffusion’ processes and ‘heavy tails’, and it agrees with (Debreu, G., 1953. Valuation equilibrium and Pareto optimum. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 40, 588–592) formulation of market behavior and his proof of Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand theorem.     

The Gender Gap

The author explains the “gender gap” as a Nash equilibrium of a game with incomplete information about women's work at home and in the marketplace. Expectations about women's lower wages leads to the overutilization of women in the household, and this, in turn, leads to lower productivity and lower wages for women in the marketplace. The situation is rational but generally Pareto inferior. With logistic learning by doing, at high levels of skill there is a Pareto‐superior equilibrium, where men and women share efforts equally at home and receive the same pay in the marketplace, firms enhance their profits, and there is more welfare at home. Inequity at home breeds inequity in the marketplace and, reciprocally, inequity in the marketplace leads to inequity at home, causing a persistent gender gap. Appropriate contracts may be needed to implement the superior solution, since generally governments do not intervene in family matters.     

A unified treatment of finite and infinite economies: limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium and the core

Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14]. Received: August 4, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997     

Oil prices and the developing countries

Many of the present difficulties of the world economy have been blamed on the two oil-price explosions of the 1970s. Professor Chichilnisky shows that, at least in the case of the oil-importing developing countries, the negative effects have been overestimated. In fact, in some respects the oil exporters among the developing countries fared worse than the oil importers.     

Emerging Market Instability: Do Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?

Changes in sovereign debt ratings and outlooks affect financialmarkets in emerging economies. They affect not only the instrumentbeing rated (bonds) but also stocks. They directly impact themarkets of the countries rated and generate cross-country contagion.The effects of rating and outlook changes are stronger duringcrises, in nontransparent economies, and in neighboring countries.Upgrades tend to take place during market rallies, whereas downgradesoccur during downturns, providing support to the idea that creditrating agencies contribute to the instability in emerging financialmarkets.     

Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox

We present a restriction on the domain of individual preferences that is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a social choice rule that is continuous, anonymous, and respects unanimity. The restriction is that the space of preferences be contractible. Contractibility admits a straightforward intuitive explanation, and is a generalisation of conditions such as single peakedness, value restrictedness and limited agreement, which were earlier shown to be sufficient for majority voting to be an acceptable rule. The only restriction on the number of individuals, is that it be finite and at least 2.