The ‘wrong skewness’ problem: a re-specification of stochastic frontiers

In this paper, we study the ‘wrong skewness phenomenon’ in stochastic frontiers (SF), which consists in the observed difference between the expected and estimated sign of the asymmetry of the composite error, and causes the ‘wrong skewness problem’, for which the estimated inefficiency in the whole industry is zero. We propose a more general and flexible specification of the SF model, introducing dependences between the two error components and asymmetry (positive or negative) of the random error. This re-specification allows us to decompose the third moment of the composite error into three components, namely: (i) the asymmetry of the inefficiency term; (ii) the asymmetry of the random error; and (iii) the structure of dependence between the error components. This decomposition suggests that the wrong skewness anomaly is an ill-posed problem, because we cannot establish ex ante the expected sign of the asymmetry of the composite error. We report a relevant special case that allows us to estimate the three components of the asymmetry of the composite error and, consequently, to interpret the estimated sign. We present two empirical applications. In the first dataset, where the classic SF has the wrong skewness, an estimation of our model rejects the dependence hypothesis, but accepts the asymmetry of the random error, thus justifying the sign of the skewness of the composite error. More importantly, we estimate a non-zero inefficiency, thus solving the wrong skewness problem. In the second dataset, where the classic SF does not yield any anomaly, an estimation of our model provides evidence for the presence of dependence. In such situations, we show that there is a remarkable difference in the efficiency distribution between the classic SF and our class of models.     

Do larger severance payments increase individual job duration?

This paper analyzes the effect of severance payments on the probability of separation at given tenure, wages and other individual and firm characteristics. It studies a mandatory deferred wage scheme of the Italian labour market (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, TFR). Deferred wages increase job duration if two conditions hold: wages are rigidly set outside the employer-employee relationship, and past provisions are accumulated at interest rates that are below market rates. Under such circumstances, workers who withdraw from their accumulated stock of unpaid wages should experience, at given tenure, a subsequent increase in the probability of separation. This prediction appears empirically robust and quantitatively sizeable. A withdrawal of 60% of the TFR stock (the median observed withdrawal) increases the instantaneous hazard rate by almost 20%. In other words, an individual with at least ten years of tenure that experiences an early withdrawal increases his/her hazard rate from 10% to about 12%. The empirical result takes into account the existence of unobserved heterogeneity and a variety of further robustness tests.     

A numerical method to price exotic path-dependent options on an underlying described by the Heston stochastic volatility model

We consider the problem of pricing European exotic path-dependent derivatives on an underlying described by the Heston stochastic volatility model. Lipton has found a closed form integral representation of the joint transition probability density function of underlying price and variance in the Heston model. We give a convenient numerical approximation of this formula and we use the obtained approximated transition probability density function to price discrete path-dependent options as discounted expectations. The expected value of the payoff is calculated evaluating an integral with the Monte Carlo method using a variance reduction technique based on a suitable approximation of the transition probability density function of the Heston model. As a test case, we evaluate the price of a discrete arithmetic average Asian option, when the average over n = 12 prices is considered, that is when the integral to evaluate is a 2n = 24 dimensional integral. We show that the method proposed is computationally efficient and gives accurate results.     

The Politics of Co-optation

Our model consists of two groups. Group 1 holds political power and Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the probability of its upheaval by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign third group. Improvements in the upheaval technology lead to fewer but better co-optation offers. Increasing the size and/or the degree of fragmentation of Group 2 has the opposite effect. If the co-opted group also threatens Group 1, co-optation transfers are reduced. Our model provides a new explanation of why growth is a politically stabilizing force. The theory suggests that, in post-Communist privatizations, unstable governments will give large benefits to a small number of beneficiaries while stable governments will give small benefits to a large group. J. Comp. Econ., December 2001, 29(4), pp. 591–607. Universita' di Modena e Reggio Emilia, I-41100 Modena, Italy; and Centre for Economic Policy Research; and Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, United Kingdom; and Centre for Economic Policy Research. © 2001 Elsevier ScienceJournal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D74, P26, D3.     

ON THE SOURCES OF HETEROGENEITY IN BANKING EFFICIENCY LITERATURE

This study reviews the empirical literature on banking efficiency by conducting a meta‐regression analysis. The meta‐dataset consists of 1661 observations retrieved from 120 papers published over the period 2000–2014. While the role of study design and method‐specific characteristics of primary studies is evaluated, the focus concerns regulation in banking. The results are fourfold. First, parametric methods always yield lower levels of banking efficiency than non‐parametric studies. Second, banking efficiency is higher in studies using the value‐added approach rather than the intermediation method. Third, efficiency scores also depend on the journal's ranking and on the number of observations and variables used in the primary papers. Finally, regulation matters: primary papers focusing on countries with a liberalized banking industry provide higher values for efficiency scores.     

The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.     

New Geography of M&As: A Framing Device of Firms' Strategies

The emergence of new economic centers is changing the competitive scenario. The diffusion of power across an increasingly broad range of countries has opened a window of opportunity for firms from China that want to compete globally. These firms understand their options in exploiting economic geography, and they frequently use cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to penetrate developed countries. The United States and Europe are becoming natural destinations for such investments because of their huge markets and leading‐edge technologies. This article provides a “framing device” for firms’ strategies in a multipolar world. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Employment And Mobility Of Workers In Industries With Different Intensity Of Innovation: Evidence On Italy From A Panel Of Workers And Firms

In this paper a panel of workers and firms is used to investigate employment composition and dynamics in industries which differ by innovation intensity. To define the latter industry-wide statistics were used (for a subset of 2,800 firms, individual data on R&D expenditures and investments in innovative processes were available from a survey on manufacturing). Firms and workers are observed over the period 1985–1991. The paper document an high rate of labour turnover. Annual separation rates are high in all size-classes, but they decline from 50% in small firms (less than 20 employees) to 13% in large ones (with more than 1,000 employees). Separations are inversely related to an industry's innovative intensity (from 18% in the highly innovative industries to 31% in the traditional industries). A logit model, which controlled for the characteristics of workers and firms, showed that the probability of separation is higher among manual and young workers and decreases monotonically with the firm size. The probability of separation declines as job tenure and, perhaps more importantly, the individual's wage increases. After controlling for these factors, the evidence suggests that the highest probability of separation is in traditional industries, the lowest is in the more innovative industries. The result is strengthened when firm-level data on R&D and other innovative expenditures are used. Other things being equal, firms that invest in R&D have a more stable labour force, and firms that invest in non-innovative processes have a less stable labour force. We therefore find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that more innovative firms cultivate more durable employer-employee relationships. The fraction of job-to-job moves (with no intervening period of unemployment) on total separations qualifies the turnover of workers. Controlling for firm size, the percentage of job-to-job moves increases fairly regularly with worker's skills and with the industry's innovative intensity. Thus the innovative intensity of he industry appears to have a positive effect on the share of job-to-job moves, while there is some evidence that it lowers the chances of separation. This result may be linked to the skills and specialisations of the workforce; it is certainly related to the higher demand for labour in the High Tech Sectors (where employment is growing) relative to the less innovative sectors.     

Looking at the determinants of efficiency in banking: evidence from Italian mutual-cooperatives

Italy has experienced a restructuring and consolidation process in the banking industry since the 1990s that is expected to foster efficiency and competition. Despite the reforms, a peculiarity of the industry is the persistence of small mutual-cooperative banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo, BCCs) active in narrow markets. The scope of this paper is to analyze the determinants of BCCs’ efficiency in the 2006–2011 period. In the first step of the study, a stochastic cost frontier is used to yield bank efficiency. Then the cost efficiency becomes the dependent variable of fixed and random effect models. The reference market of BCCs is the province (NUTS3). We find that BCC cost efficiency is positively affected by market concentration and demand density and inversely related to branching. Importantly, these results are robust to any sample restriction anchored to the distribution of efficiency. While the evidence regarding the credit quality is inconclusive for all BCCs, the sensitivity analysis shows that the risk in local markets is a source of BCC cost inefficiency.