Finance and growth in Africa: The broken link

While bank liabilities in Sub-Saharan Africa are found to follow (but not lead) economic growth, the link between bank credit and growth is altogether absent.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.     

Managerial style and the strategic choice of executive incentives

This paper analyzes a two-stage duopoly model where owners provide incentives to managers who then select output levels. Unlike the previous Cournot models on the strategic use of incentives (e.g. Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987), managers hold different beliefs about their rivals. Managers and executives are classified by ‘management style’ based on the aggressiveness of their beliefs. It is shown that many of the standard results of the strategic managerial incentive literature no longer hold when executives have differing managerial styles. For example, owners may ‘penalize’ their managers for sales, or they may optimally instruct their managers to maximize profits, in contrast to the standard Cournot findings. Indeed, the model yields a necessary and sufficient condition for compensation contracts to specify pure profit-maximizing behavior when managers have differing managerial styles. Thus, the analysis suggests that when ownership and control are separated, owners must carefully assess the belief structure (management style) of their executives before designing the compensation package.     

Nursing home choice,family bargaining,and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy

We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choice of nursing homes by families, and on the locations and prices chosen by nursing homes in a Hotelling economy. In the baseline (static) model, where the dependent parent cares only about the location of the nursing home, the markup of nursing homes is increasing in the bargaining power of the dependent parent, and nursing homes are located at the extreme periphery. We compare the laissez‐faire with the social optimum (which involves more central locations of nursing homes), and examine its decentralization in first‐best and second‐best settings. We explore the robustness of our results to introducing a bequest motive in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which allows us to study the joint dynamics of wealth accumulation and nursing home prices. If the bequest motive is strong, the markup is decreasing in the bargaining power of the dependent. However, wealth accumulation, by reducing interest rates, raises markup rates and nursing homes prices.     

Casinos,casino size,and crime: A panel data analysis of Michigan counties

Growth in legal gaming in the United States over the past quarter century or so is well-documented. One important factor fueling this growth was the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which permitted Native American tribes to establish, under agreements or “compacts” with the states in which they are located, casinos offering what is known as Class III gaming: slot machines, blackjack, roulette, and other games. Since the passage of the Act, there have been 21 Native American casinos established in Michigan. Also, three non-Native American casinos opened in Detroit in 1999 and 2000. This growth in the number of casinos has sparked a wide-ranging debate over the social and economic impacts of casino development.The purpose of this research is to focus on the crime issue in the broader casino debate. We investigate the impact of these Michigan casinos on the rates of burglary, robbery, larceny and motor vehicle theft (property crimes) in casino host counties as well as in nearby counties. We employ a panel data set with annual observations on all 83 Michigan counties for the period 1994–2010. The dataset includes crime rates taken from the FBI crime data series, variables for the presence of a casino in a county or in a nearby county, the scale of a casino's operations as measured by revenues, and a variety of control variables suggested by the broader literature investigating the factors that determine crime rates generally.Our results suggest that in most cases the property crime rates studied are not affected by the presence or size of a casino in a county or in a nearby county. The largest such impact, which is negative, is for motor vehicle theft. The size of a casino does have a small positive effect on the motor vehicle theft rate.     

Why Do They Keep Coming Back? The Effect of Push Motives vs. Pull Motives,and Attribute Satisfaction on Repeat Visitation of Tourist Destinations

We conjecture that attribute satisfaction, push motives and pull motives will be positively related to return visitation of tourist destinations. We also hypothesize that push factors will be stronger related to return visitation of tourist destinations than pull factors, both directly and indirectly as mediators of the relationship between attribute satisfaction and return visitation. In addition, we predict that age and gender will moderate the effect of push and pull factors on repeat visitation. Finally, we argue that push factors and pull factors will be mutually reinforcing. To test these hypotheses, we conducted an online survey of repeat tourists’ motives, and received 986 complete responses. Survey participants were randomly chosen from a group that met a series or qualifying questions. PLS-SEM analysis of the data showed that, as we hypothesized, attribute satisfaction and push motives were positively related to repeat visitation. In contrast, pull motives were not related to repeat visitation, either directly or indirectly, but did reinforce the effect of push motives; gender did not moderate either push or pull motives and age moderated only pull motives. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.