首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   135402篇
  免费   3219篇
  国内免费   1篇
财政金融   25436篇
工业经济   11548篇
计划管理   21475篇
经济学   28761篇
综合类   1431篇
运输经济   954篇
旅游经济   2482篇
贸易经济   23395篇
农业经济   6070篇
经济概况   16801篇
信息产业经济   8篇
邮电经济   261篇
  2021年   832篇
  2020年   1622篇
  2019年   2372篇
  2018年   2281篇
  2017年   2480篇
  2016年   2670篇
  2015年   2085篇
  2014年   3405篇
  2013年   15257篇
  2012年   4170篇
  2011年   4079篇
  2010年   3663篇
  2009年   4276篇
  2008年   3878篇
  2007年   3182篇
  2006年   3558篇
  2005年   3542篇
  2004年   3080篇
  2003年   2847篇
  2002年   2835篇
  2001年   2587篇
  2000年   2521篇
  1999年   2433篇
  1998年   2287篇
  1997年   2312篇
  1996年   2171篇
  1995年   1966篇
  1994年   1994篇
  1993年   1966篇
  1992年   2009篇
  1991年   1893篇
  1990年   1793篇
  1989年   1665篇
  1988年   1607篇
  1987年   1595篇
  1986年   1678篇
  1985年   2425篇
  1984年   2310篇
  1983年   2107篇
  1982年   1977篇
  1981年   1908篇
  1980年   1879篇
  1979年   1807篇
  1978年   1631篇
  1977年   1624篇
  1976年   1390篇
  1975年   1277篇
  1974年   1187篇
  1973年   1187篇
  1972年   900篇
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
A new physical infrastructure to support activities based on communications and the transmission of information is being developed. Part of this infrastructure includes the construction of ‘intelligent’ buildings which are seen to play as important a role in improving efficiency of office workers as automation has played on the shopfloor of manufacturing industry. The location of these buildings is important. This article focuses on two types of experimental office development—neighbourhood offices and resort offices.  相似文献   
196.
Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication through Earnings   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.  相似文献   
197.
198.
199.
The pensions pillarisation agenda envisages a reduction in the role of social insurance while simultaneously advocating the parallel expansion of fully funded private sector, occupational and personal retirement contingencies. Widespread perception of looming state failure in the field of pensions delivery highlights the inherent limitations of current pension delivery arrangements. However, moves to de-emphasise the provision afforded by, predominantly, monopillar state-mandated pension systems by expanding private privision represent short-term palliative responses to deep rooted structural and demographic problems. Multipillar systems appear no more capable of guaranteeing system funding in the face of demographic ageing and structural unemployment than existing monopillar systems. Moreover, a diminished role for social insurance will leave the low paid and unemployed significantly more vulnerable in old age. Consequently, this paper argues for a pension reform agenda which, in terms of levels of income substitution, will secure an adequate social insurance element into the future.  相似文献   
200.
This article begins with an explanation of how moral development for organizations has parallels to Kohlberg's categorization of the levels of individual moral development. Then the levels of organizational moral development are integrated into the literature on corporate social performance by relating them to different stakeholder orientations. Finally, the authors propose a model of organizational moral development that emphasizes the role of top management in creating organizational processes that shape the organizational and institutional components of corporate social performance. This article represents one approach to linking the distinct streams of business ethics and business-and-society research into a more complete understanding of how managers and firms address complex ethical and social issues.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号