VERTICAL MERGERS,FORECLOSURE AND RAISING RIVALS' COSTS – EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE*

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash equilibrium. The laboratory data reported in this paper provide experimental evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Markets with a vertically integrated firm are significantly less competitive than those where firms are separate. While the experimental results violate the standard equilibrium notion, they are consistent with the quantal‐response generalization of Nash equilibrium.     

Options in Compensation: Promises and Pitfalls

We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.     

Monetary Policy Inclinations

We examine whether central banks should complement their inflation forecasts with interest rate projections. Introducing a central bank loss function that accounts for deviations from announcements, we incorporate the publication of policy inclinations into a dynamic monetary model. We show that in the presence of cost‐push shocks, the publication of interest rate forecasts tends to improve welfare.     

Attribute Elicitation in Marketing Research: A Comparison of Three Procedures

This article compares three attribute elicitation procedures commonlyapplied in marketing research—free elicitation (FE), hierarchicaldichotomization (HD), and Kelly's repertory grid—on type ofinformation generated, convergent validity, efficiency in datacollection, and consumers' reaction to the elicitation task. On mostcriteria, RG and HD were not significantly different. The maincontrasts were found between FE on the one hand and RG and HD on theother hand. FE yielded more attributes, a higher proportion of abstractattributes, and a higher level of articulation and was more timeefficient. FE was also evaluated more positively by respondents thanthe other two techniques. Despite these differences, the threeprocedures exhibited a considerable degree of convergent validity interms of the basic categories of concepts uncovered in the elicitationprocedure. Unless the marketing research technique for which theattributes are elicited requires attributes at a low level ofabstraction, the results suggest that FE is to be preferred to HD andRG.     

Regulated Competition under Increasing Returns to Scale

In the classical models of regulation economics, a mechanism that secures truthful revelation involves paying a subsidy to the firm. In this paper, we investigate whether it is possible to create a regulatory mechanism under a no‐subsidy constraint that induces the firm to report its private information truthfully. We consider a number of firms operating under regulated competition and with increasing returns to scale technology. It is shown that in equilibrium each firm chooses to report truthfully without receiving any subsidy. The use of competition may give rise to an efficiency loss due to the increasing returns to scale. However, we show that our mechanism may still be better, from a social welfare point of view, than the case of monopoly regulation that involves no subsidy.     

Do Individual Investors Have Asymmetric Information Based on Work Experience?

Using a novel data set covering all individual investors' stock market transactions in Norway over 10 years, we analyze whether individual investors have a preference for professionally close stocks, and whether they make excess returns on such investments. After excluding own‐company stock holdings, investors hold 11% of their portfolio in stocks within their two‐digit industry of employment. Given the poor hedging properties of such investments, one would expect abnormally high returns. In contrast, all estimates of abnormal returns are negative, in many cases statistically significant. Overconfidence seems the most likely explanation for the excessive trading in professionally close stocks.     

Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests

The relation between the square of the quoted bid-ask spread and two serial covariances—the serial covariance of transaction returns and the serial covariance of quoted returns—is modeled as a function of the probability of a price reversal, π, and the magnitude of a price change, ?, where ? is stated as a fraction of the quoted spread. Different models of the spread are contrasted in terms of the parameters, π and ?. Using data on the transaction prices and price quotations for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, π and ? are estimated and the relative importance of the components of the quoted spread—adverse information costs, order processing costs, and inventory holding costs—is determined.     

Capital Versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts

Building on contract theory, we argue that financial covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers via two different mechanisms. Capital covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder–shareholder interests. Performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. Consistent with these arguments, we find that the use of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting‐based covenants can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.