Binary effectivity rules

A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization.     

Consumer reporting: A conceptual framework for the organizational level

In this paper, a conceptual framework for consumer reporting at the organizational level is developed. Consumer reporting is defined as the provision of information by an organization to its consumers with respect to the effects of its activities judged relevant by those consumers. In this context, the term organization covers business firms but also governmental agencies, hospitals, charities, and other non-profit organizations with relations to their consumers/clients.The concept of consumer satisfaction is regarded as the core element of consumer reporting. Several issues with respect to consumer satisfaction and dissatisfaction as well as their measurement are discussed. It is concluded that perceptual indicators of consumer satisfaction should constitute the core of consumer reporting in establishing the consumer profile of the organization. However, additional information could be provided too, for instance situational indicators of consumer satisfaction or information about consumer dissatisfaction. All of this information should be geared towards the goal of accounting for the resulting organizational strategy and policies towards the consumers. Several practical examples are given to illustrate the items about which information can be provided and the fact that consumer reporting can be realized in practice.

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Berichterstattung von Organisationen für Verbraucher: ein konzeptioneller Rahmen

Zusammenfassung Eine solche Berichterstattung wird im vorliegenden Beitrag definiert als Informationen einer Organisation für ihre Konsumenten über diejenigen Wirkungen ihrer Aktivitäten, die von diesen Konsumenten für wichtig gehalten werden. Der Begriff Organisation steht hier nicht nur für kommerzielle Firmen, sondern auch für Behörden, Krankenhäuser, Stiftungen und andere nicht gewinnorientierte Organisationen mit ihren jeweiligen Beziehungen zu ihren Verbrauchern bzw. Klienten.Das Konzept der Verbraucherzufriedenheit steht dabei im Mittelpunkt. Deshalb werden zunächst dieses Konzept und die Methoden zur Messung von Verbraucherzufriedenheit diskutiert. Ergebnis ist dabei, daß das Konsumentenprofil einer Organisation durch perzipierte Indikatoren ermöglicht wird. Figur 1 gibt hierfür ein Beispiel. Das Konsumentenprofiel kann durch situative Indikatoren und durch Informationen über Verbraucherzufriedenheit ergänzt werden (Figur 2). Alle diese Informationen sollten zum Ziel haben, die Unternehmenspolitik gegenüber den Konsumenten zu verantworten.Zum Schluß werden einige praktische Beispiele behandelt, die einerseits zeigen, welche Informationen solche Berichterstattungen enthalten können, und andererseits, daß es in der Praxis bereits Ansätze in dieser Richtung gibt.

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Hans Kasper is Associate Professor of Marketing and Hein Schreuder Professor of Business Economics at the Faculty of Economics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, NL-6200 MD Masstricht, The Netherlands.     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

On the theory of cost sharing

This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a -cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement -cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Analyzing a panel of seasonal time series: Does seasonality in industrial production converge across Europe?

In this paper we consider deterministic seasonal variation in quarterly industrial production for several European countries, and we address the question whether this variation has become more similar across countries over time. Due to economic and institutional factors, one may expect convergence across business cycles. When these have similar characteristics as seasonal cycles, one may perhaps also find convergence in seasonality. To this aim, we propose a method that is based on treating the set of production series as a panel. By testing for the relevant parameter restrictions for moving window samples, we examine the hypothesis of convergence in deterministic seasonality while allowing for seasonal unit roots. Our main empirical finding is that there is no evidence for convergence in seasonality.