Optimum allocation in multivariate stratified random sampling with overhead cost

The problem of allocating the sample numbers to the strata in multivariate stratified surveys, where, apart from the cost involved in enumerating the selected individuals in the sample, there is an overhead cost associated with each stratum, has been formulated as a non-linear programming problem. The variances of the posterior distributions of the means of various characters are put to restraints and the total cost is minimized. The main problem is broken into subproblems for each of which the objective function turns out to be convex. When the number of subproblems happens to be large an approach has been indicated for obtaining an approximate solution by solving only a small number of subproblems.     

The market’s view on the probability of banking sector failure: cross-country comparisons

Hall and Miles (1990) suggest an approach of estimating default probabilities of banks using stock market information, and in this paper we apply an aggregated version of their approach to banking sectors around the world in both developed and emerging economies. We study the market’s assessment of the probability of systemic banking crises world wide over the last decade, including the Asian crisis 1997–1998. In addition, we investigate whether there is a relationship between the failure probability and institutional features of the actual banking sector. The quality of governance and the degree of law and order in a country is found to be significantly negatively related to the market based failure probabilities as is an explicit deposit insurance during periods of crisis.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

A constraint-free approach to optimal reinsurance

Reinsurance is available for a reinsurance premium that is determined according to a convex premium principle H. The first insurer selects the reinsurance coverage that maximizes its expected utility. No conditions are imposed on the reinsurer's payment. The optimality condition involves the gradient of H. For several combinations of H and the first insurer's utility function, closed-form formulas for the optimal reinsurance are given. If H is a zero utility principle (for example, an exponential principle or an expectile principle), it is shown, by means of Borch's Theorem, that the optimal reinsurer's payment is a function of the total claim amount and that this function satisfies the so-called 1-Lipschitz condition. Frequently, authors impose these two conclusions as hypotheses at the outset.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.