Does the dutch model really exist?

The policy that led from the "Dutch disease" (in the 1980s) to the "Dutch miracle" (in the 1990s) consists of three tracks: wage moderation, retrenching public expenditure and reducing the tax burden, and slimming the welfare system. The wage moderation track seems to have been the most important. The term "Dutch model" refers to the socioeconomic system of the Netherlands. Most observers point particularly to the relatively low unemployment rate to indicate the success of this model. However, the economic inactivity rate in the Netherlands is not lower than in neighboring countries. This suggests that open unemployment in the Netherlands has been partly replaced with hidden unemployment. In particular, the disability scheme seems to contain a large component of hidden unemployment. Another feature of the Dutch model is its consensus-seeking nature, which is fostered by its institutional structure.     

Conditional utility

Summary The motivation for this paper starts out with a decision situation under risk where the decision-maker has to choose among various lottery tickets. We will ask what happens to a person's lottery choice if he is given additional information in terms of probabilities on some states of nature which might affect his choice among lottery tickets. In other words, in evaluating his decision situation, a person should not only consider the probability of a certain prospect to be realized but also the problem how and to which extent some state(s) of nature modify the utility of this prospect. This problem has not been dealt with in Bernoullian utility theory.We state several conditions which are necessary and sufficient to treat conditional utility as Bernoullian utility. Then we show as a main result that it is possible to represent expected utility of decision acts (in Savage's terminology) by conditional expected utility of prospects which preserves well-known properties of expected utility with the exception of linearity.We give a potential application of the notion of conditional utility to the estimation of the value of information as a residual value of prior and posterior utility.     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

Prediction of the next hypercalcemia free period: application of random effect models with selection on first event

The length of repeated hypercalcemia free periods of patients with bone metastasis of breast cancer with at least one hypercalcemic event was modelled according to a generalized linear mixed model formulated in terms of transition probabilities and according to a latent variable model. In the former case the periods were assumed to be lognormally distributed with two variance components (patients and residue). In the latter case the conditional intensity given a patient was assumed to be the intensity of the Weibull distribution, while the random patient effect (frailty) was assumed to be drawn from a gamma distribution. In both cases the selection of only patients with at least one hypercalcemic event was taken into consideration. In both models the variance of the patient effect turned out to be negligible. For the second and later periods the Weibull appeared to fit better than the lognormal model. For the first period there was almost no information available.     

Are you really doing good things in your boss's eyes? Interactive effects of employee innovative work behavior and leader–member exchange on supervisory performance ratings

Organizations increasingly depend on employee efforts to innovate. However, the quality of relationships between leaders and employees may affect the recognition that employees receive for their innovative work behaviors. Drawing from a social cognition perspective, we tested a model in which leader–member exchange (LMX) moderates the impact of employee innovative work behavior on supervisory ratings of employee performance. Results from two multisource studies combining self, colleague, and supervisor ratings consistently showed that employees receive more favorable performance ratings by engaging in innovative work behavior when they have high‐quality LMX relationships. Moreover, we found that this interactive relationship was mediated by leader perceptions of innovative employee efforts, providing support for a moderated mediation model. Implications for the literatures on performance appraisal, LMX, and innovation are discussed.     

Club theory and household formation

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi-member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists in the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among households where no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities, but not in their presence.     

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice35 (1980), 437-455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81.