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11.
Hans-Theo Normann 《Journal of Economics》1997,66(2):177-187
In this paper, the endogenous order of quantity decision is studied in a duopoly model with incomplete information. One firm knows the state of the demand curve while the other firm remains uninformed. Firms have to commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. While, a priori, simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria are possible, only Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, emerge endogenously. 相似文献
12.
This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of
punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions
increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements.
Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities
reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance
for the experimental outcome.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
13.
Hans-Theo Normann 《European Economic Review》2009,53(4):461-335
This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising-rivals’-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here. 相似文献
14.
We derive a simple sufficient‐statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax‐transfer system is second‐best Pareto efficient. If it is not, then it is beyond the top of the Laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self‐financing. The test depends on the income distribution, extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, and income effect parameters. A tax‐transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income. We apply this test to the German tax‐transfer system, and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out. 相似文献
15.
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. 相似文献
16.
One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric Cournot duopoly, we conduct internet treatments lasting more than a month. Subjects make the same number of decisions as in the short-term counterparts, but they decide once a day. We compare these treatments to corresponding standard laboratory treatments and also to short-term internet treatments lasting one hour. We do not observe differences in behavior between the short- and long-term in the symmetric treatments, and only a small difference in the asymmetric treatments. We overall conclude that behavior is not considerably different between the short- and long-term. 相似文献
17.
Recently it has been shown that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable. In this note we show that this finding depends
on the use of the infinite population ESS (Maynard-Smith, Evolution and the theory of games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, 1982). When applying the finite-population ESS (Schaffer, J Theor Biol 132:469–478, 1988) we show that the conjectures surviving in the long run are not consistent.
相似文献
18.
19.
Mariana Blanco Dirk Engelmann Alexander K. Koch Hans-Theo Normann 《Experimental Economics》2010,13(4):412-438
Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. But this allows risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of the other decisions. So can we trust the existing belief-elicitation results? And can we avoid potential hedging confounds? We propose an experimental design that theoretically eliminates hedging opportunities. Using this design, we test for the empirical relevance of hedging effects in the lab. Our results suggest that hedging confounds are not a major problem unless hedging opportunities are very prominent. If hedging opportunities are transparent, and incentives to hedge are strong, many subjects do spot hedging opportunities and respond to them. The bias can go beyond players actually hedging themselves, because some expect others to hedge and best respond to this. 相似文献
20.
Hans‐Theo Normann 《Metroeconomica》2000,51(3):343-366
Conscious parallelism refers to collusive forms of parallel pricing in oligopoly. In this paper, four distinct pricing methods which all impose some form of parallel conduct are analysed. The pricing methods maximize joint profits if, and only if, firms are symmetric. With asymmetries in cost, total gains from collusion are reduced and absolute and relative collusive gains differ between firms. For many collusive optima, low‐cost firms have only little to gain from conscious parallelism. This is particularly the case when the degree of product homogeneity is high. 相似文献