The economic contribution of the “C” in ICT: Evidence from OECD countries

Numerous studies have documented the contribution of ICT to growth. Less has been done on the contribution of communications technology, the “C” in ICT. We construct an international dataset of fourteen OECD countries and present contributions to growth for each ICT asset (IT hardware, CT equipment and software) using alternative ICT deflators. Using each country’s deflator we find that the contribution of CT capital deepening to productivity growth is lower in the EU than the US. Thus we ask: is that lower contribution due to a lower rate of CT investment or differing sources and methods for measurement of price change? We find that: (a) there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across countries; (b) in terms of growth-accounting, price harmonisation has a greater impact on the measured contributions of IT hardware and software in the EU relative to the US, than that of CT equipment; over 1996–2013, harmonising investment prices explains just 15% of the gap in the EU CT contribution relative to the US, compared to 25% for IT hardware; (c) over 1996–2013, CT capital deepening accounted for 0.11% pa (6% as a share) of labour productivity growth (LPG) in the US, compared to 0.03% pa (2.5% of LPG) in the EU-13 when using national accounts deflators; and (d) using OECD harmonised deflators, the figure for the EU-13 is raised to 0.04% pa (4% of LPG).     

A law of large numbers for large economies

Summary LetX(i),i[0; 1] be a collection of identically distributed and pairwise uncorrelated random variables with common finite mean and variance ². This paper shows the law of large numbers, i.e. the fact that ₀ ¹ X(i)di=. It does so by interpreting the integral as a Pettis-integral. Studying Riemann sums, the paper first provides a simple proof involving no more than the calculation of variances, and demonstrates, that the measurability problem pointed out by Judd (1985) is avoided by requiring convergence in mean square rather than convergence almost everywhere. We raise the issue of when a random continuum economy is a good abstraction for a large finite economy and give an example in which it is not.I am indebted to Hugo Hopenhayn. Furthermore I would like to thank Dilip Abreu, Glenn Donaldson, Ed Green, Ramon Marimon, Nabil Al-Najjar, Victor Rios-Rull, Timothy van Zandt and the editor for useful comments. The first version of this paper was written in 1987.     

Perspectives on Michael A. Bernstein's A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Purpose in Twentieth-Century America *

The article compares Joseph Schumpeter's well-known perspectives of long term economic development with those put forward in the 1920's by the German economist Werner Sombart who followed an approach of ‘theoretical historicism’. There was general agreement between Schumpeter and Sombart that capitalism as an economic system was on the decline. Whereas according to Sombart this was attributable to a tendancy towards stagnation; in Schumpeter's view capitalism was doomed due to its success, not for its failure. The strongest parallels are to be found with respect to forces driving the transformation process, at the end of which Schumpeter expected a socialist system whereas Sombart envisioned some kind of mixed economy. The article also discusses the relevance of differences of approaches and of value judgments for the results of both authors' investigations.     

Cantillon and Ricardo effects: Hayek's contributions to business cycle theory

The distinctive line of argument in Hayek' business cycle theory can be characterized as a combination of the Cantillon effect monetary expansion on the price structure and the Ricardo effect of a shortage of consumption goods on the production of investment goods. This paper compares the original ideas of Cantillon and Ricardo with their adaptation and combination by Hayek. The differences help to expose fundamental problems in Hayek' theory and, more generally, in projects of integrating money and the business-cycle phenomenon with Walrasian general equilibrium theory.     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.