Modeling the diffusion of public policy innovations among the U.S. States

This paper describes and validates a general model of state diffusion of public policy innovations. The model can be used to identify whether new policies are likely to become fully adopted into the system of states and the time horizon over which this is likely to occur. Limitations and extensions of the model are also concluded.     

Credit access for high-risk borrowers in financially concentrated markets: Do SBA loan guarantees help?

The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan guarantee program was established to correct financial capital market inefficiencies and improve small business access to financial capital. However, the SBA loan guarantee program has been criticized for its failure to improve the performance of financial capital markets available to small businesses. This study considers the financial capital market failure created by lenders' monopoly power (specifically, financial market concentration) in financial capital markets. Based on this potential market failure, a model is derived to evaluate the behavior of lenders and borrowers in financial capital markets. Using the national Survey of Small Business Finance, this study compares the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without SBA loan guarantees, and provides a qualitative assessment of the SBA's ability to correct financial capital market inefficiencies. When considering only the interaction between borrower quality and the degree of financial market concentration, high-risk borrowers in high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving an SBA loan guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. However, when other factors influencing the demand for financial capital are included in the model, only the borrower attributes (credit risk and age) are significant. While the SBA loan guarantee program appears to partially mitigate the effects of the market failure caused by financial market concentration for high-risk borrowers, the program appears to be better designed to address borrower risk, rather than credit market failure.     

Hit and Run or Sit and Wait? Contestability Revisited in a Price-Comparison Site-Mediated Market

The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the “almost perfectly contestable market” envisaged by the contestability theorists where “hit-and-run” entry was conjectured to constrain sellers to zero-profit outcomes. We investigate hit and run using a unique unbalanced panel of 295 digital-camera markets mediated by NexTag.com. We find, however, in line with Farrell (1986a)’s prediction, a bifurcation of strategies with low reputation/smaller participants favouring a hit-and-run strategy involving lower entry prices and shorter forays into the market than their high reputation/larger rivals. Furthermore, the former entrants induce a much larger price response from low-reputation incumbents, reflecting the more intense rivalry for the price-sensitive consumers willing to eschew retailer reputations.