R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

Does the Group Leader Affect Repayment Performance Differently?

Theoretical models of group lending assume that all group members are identical in terms of their effect on repayment performance. In practice, however, this may not be true. We use a unique data set obtained from a survey of 160 borrowing groups in Jordan to investigate the impact of joint liability, screening and monitoring activities, and social ties of the group leader and other group members on repayment performance as measured by the intensity of default using a negative binomial II model. Our results suggest that the joint liability and screening activities of the leader are more strongly related to repayment performance than the same variables for the rest of the group members. Social ties of all members have a significant effect on repayment, while monitoring activities have no effect.     

Reforming the Financial Health Care System： The Case of the Republic of Albania

The Albanian health care system is currently in a period of deep transformation as well as the country is reflecting the future reforms after the turbulent development of the most recent years. The admission of Albania among future members of the European Union requires also an innovation in the health care system in order to build a model more compliant with the European performance and standards. These innovations are required also in the managerial approach to the health care and in its financing system. The aim of this paper is to analyze the actual financing model of the Albanian health care sector while highlighting the possible future managerial development. First of all, this article presents a history review of the Albanian health-care system, analyzing the current governance model. The goal of this approach is to describe the starting point of the reform paths for the future policy makers. Afterwards the research underlines the transition from a financing model based on historical public expenditure to a system based on the performance as one of the main innovation in the managerial approach to the health care. The introduction of management thinking will then allow developing a cost-based financing model, an accounting system in the teaching hospital and, finally, a financing system able to pay for services provided by private health care entities. The article then offers also a contribution to policy makers in order to define the ＂paths＂ of the Albanian health care system in the next years.     

The role of satisfaction in labor diaspora dynamics: An analysis of BREXIT effects

In diaspora research, people's international mobility is often understood as a response to pull-push forces on an economic macro-level or as part of diasporic waves. However, labor diaspora formations are also influenced by micro-level (i.e., individual perceptions) drivers related to work per se, such as satisfaction. This explorative qualitative study takes a novel angle and focuses on the role of Portuguese nurses’ satisfaction with the evaluation of the Brexit scenario and its effects on this labor diaspora's mobility and stability. The findings illustrate that satisfaction, although affected by uncertainty, mainly relates to perceived working conditions and legislation and the possibilities to communicate with locals and other diasporans. This paper provides suggestions for future research and contributes to the development of theory on staying and human stickiness, explaining the dynamics of exit and entry in (re-)migration decision making.     

Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian protocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with equal probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payoffs coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the indifference conditions can be reinterpreted in the language of the kernel.