Uncovering the Risk–Return Relation in the Stock Market

There is ongoing debate about the apparent weak or negative relation between risk (conditional variance) and expected returns in the aggregate stock market. We develop and estimate an empirical model based on the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) that separately identifies the two components of expected returns, namely, the risk component and the component due to the desire to hedge changes in investment opportunities. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is positive, statistically significant, and reasonable in magnitude. However, expected returns are driven primarily by the hedge component. The omission of this component is partly responsible for the existing contradictory results.     

Rural Population Growth, 1950–1990: The Roles of Human Capital, Industry Structure, and Government Policy

Human capital raises rural incomes, but this effect is swamped by higher returns to human capital in urban markets. This leads to "brain drain" from rural areas. Populations grow more rapidly in rural counties that have a diversified employment base. Farm population grows faster (or declines more slowly) in counties with relatively high farm income, and nonfarm populations grow faster in counties with relatively high nonfarm income. However, higher farm incomes lead to slower nonfarm population growth and vice versa. Rural county government services financed by local taxes or debt have neutral or negative effects on population growth.     

Analysis of Beef Producers' Risk Management Perceptions and Desire for Further Risk Management Education

Beef cattle producers were surveyed in Texas and Nebraska to investigate perceptions of sources of risk, the effectiveness of risk management strategies, and interest in further risk management education, particularly production risk, using probit analysis. Important decision variables identified are age, prior use of risk management tools, previous attendances of risk management education, and risk aversion. Severe drought and cattle price variability are identified as primary risk factors with potential to affect farm income. Extremely cold weather and disease are of less importance. Understocking pasture and storing hay are perceived most effective as risk management options.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

The New Growth Theory and Coasean economics: Institutions to capture externalities

The New Growth Theory and Coasean Economics: Institutions to Capture Externalities. — This paper presents the main theoretical arguments which lead many adherents of the New Growth Theory to the conclusion that externalities in research and development are important for economic growth and warrant government subsidies. In contrast, the authors point to private institutions like associations, company structures and industry clusters which can capture such externalities. An international comparison of private R&;D investment and special features of institutions in Switzerland and Japan are in line with this hypothesis. Thus, the argument for R&;D subsidies made by the New Growth Theory is considerably reduced.     

Cooperative and noncooperative protection against transferable and filterable externalities

Given self-protection from an undesirable environmental externality, we examine, under several conditions, the efficiency properties of cooperative and noncooperative behavior. We demonstrate that if self-protection can transfer the externality to another agent, then noncooperative behavior will lead to overprotection. If self-protection filters or dilutes the externality, then noncooperation leads to underprotection. In addition, overprotection will worsen if an agent with more relative power is allowed a first-mover advantage or if the damage function is elastic and transferability is uncertain. Finally, a reduction in uncertainty about transferability will accentuate overprotection if the damage function is inelastic. Our results suggest that coordination of protection activities among agents will enhance the overall gains from environmental policy in the European Single Internal Market of 1992. Coordination minimizes the costs of environmental protection, thereby reducing the public credibility of its foes.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.