Erhöht Solvency II den Bedarf an Rückversicherung im Schaden-/Unfallgeschäft in Deutschland?

Reinsurers and reinsurance brokers are often of the opinion that the introduction of Solvency II will lead to changes in how re-insurance is purchased. Our analysis of these assumptions for the German property and casualty insurance market lead to a market survey. This survey revealed that overall the participating insurance companies expect no significant changes for their companies, although they do anticipate changes in buying patterns of the rest of the market and in the overall market environment. This paper examines the reasons for this difference in expectations between those of individual companies and those of the overall market.     

Personal value systems of Japanese trainees and managers in a changing competitive system

A study of personal values held by Japanese and foreign students, trainees and managers showed recent Japanese trainees slightly more conservative than their 1979 cohorts. Foreign students and foreign managers held more pro-American work values than either Japanese managers or trainees. Finally, for the Japanese respondents, there was some evidence of specific shifts away from the Japanese employment system in the areas of thenenko compensation and promotion systems in their organisations.Roy J. Adams is a Professor of Industrial Relations in McMaster University; Richard B. Peterson is a Professor of Management and Organization in the University of Washington; Hermann F. Schwind is an Associate Professor in St. Mary's University.     

Corporate governance and incentive contracts: Historical evidence from a legal reform

This paper proposes to exploit a reform in legal rules of corporate governance to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. In particular, we refer to a major shift in the legal and institutional environment, the reform of the German joint-stock companies act in 1884. We analyze a sample of executive pay for 46 firms for the years 1870–1911. In 1884, a legal reform substantially enhanced corporate control, strengthened the monitoring incentives of shareholders, and reduced the discretionary power of executives in Germany. The pay–performance sensitivity decreased significantly after this reform. While executives received a bonus of about 3–5% in profits before 1884, after the reform this parameter decreased to a profit share of about 2%. At least the profit share that is eliminated by the reform most likely was incentive pay before. This incentive mechanism was replaced by other elements of corporate governance.     

Einzelbesprechungen

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜbersetzt von Hans Fried, Wien.     

Strukturwandlungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Neuere Literatur über die Wirtschaft in Mitteleuropa

Ohne Zusammenfassung