Spatial and temporal price and allocation modeling: Some extensions

This paper delineated the conditions under which linear complimentarity programming is applicable in the area of spatial and temporal price and allocation modeling. Two examples are offered which are not solvable using the previous methodology available.     

Asset bubbles,labour market frictions and R&D‐based growth

Employing an overlapping generations model of R&D‐based growth with labour market frictions, this paper examines how employment changes induced by labour market frictions influence asset bubbles and long‐run economic growth. Asset bubbles can (cannot) exist when the employment rate is high (low), which leads to higher (lower) economic growth through labour market efficiency. We also explore the steady state and transitional dynamics of bubbles, economic growth and employment. Furthermore, we show that policy or parameter changes with a negative influence on the labour market can lead to a bubble burst.     

Asymptotics of the probability of minimizing ‘down-side’ risk under partial information

We consider minimizing the probability of falling below a target growth rate of the wealth process up to a time horizon T in an incomplete market model under partial information and then study the asymptotic behavior of the minimizing probability as T → ∞. This problem is closely related to an ergodic risk-sensitive stochastic control problem under partial information in the risk-averse case. Indeed, in our main theorem we relate the former problem to the latter as its dual. As a result we obtain an explicit expression for the limit value of the former problem in the case of linear Gaussian models.     

Managerial Myopia,Earnings Guidance,and Investment*

This study investigates the real effects of management communication, specifically of forecasts or earnings guidance, on investment. Managers can signal the strength of their projects through accuracy in their earnings guidance. This leads less accurate managers to distort their investments; the equilibrium investment strategy involves over-investment when earnings exceed the forecast and under-investment when earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that managers are pessimistic in their forecasts, which helps to explain the corresponding well-documented empirical regularity. This downward bias increases the likelihood of investment manipulation but decreases the real loss from distortion. Interestingly, the over-investment induced by earnings guidance helps to mitigate the classic under-investment problem for a myopic manager with unobservable investment. Earnings guidance can therefore be value-increasing when managerial myopia is severe.