全文获取类型
收费全文 | 59篇 |
免费 | 0篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 7篇 |
工业经济 | 3篇 |
计划管理 | 10篇 |
经济学 | 21篇 |
贸易经济 | 6篇 |
经济概况 | 10篇 |
信息产业经济 | 2篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 1篇 |
2021年 | 1篇 |
2020年 | 4篇 |
2019年 | 2篇 |
2017年 | 1篇 |
2016年 | 3篇 |
2015年 | 3篇 |
2014年 | 4篇 |
2013年 | 1篇 |
2012年 | 1篇 |
2011年 | 2篇 |
2010年 | 3篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 1篇 |
2007年 | 2篇 |
2006年 | 6篇 |
2005年 | 2篇 |
2004年 | 1篇 |
2003年 | 2篇 |
2002年 | 1篇 |
1999年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 3篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 2篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1971年 | 2篇 |
1966年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有59条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
11.
Summary This paper establishes an existence theorem of a non-trivial (positive capital stock) steady-state equilibrium in Diamond's (1965) overlapping-generations model with production by employing the steady-state consumption curve introduced in Ihori (1978). The assumptions on preferences and production technologies that ensure the existence of a nontrivial steadystate equilibrium are separated from each other, unlike in Galor and Ryder (1989). We also provide two simple examples which illustrate the importance of two conditions in the theorem.Detailed comments by Tomoichi Shinotsuka and the referees of the journal were quite helpful. We also thank Marcus Berliant, Mark Bus, John H. Boyd III, Ban Chuan Cheah, Rajat Deb, Jim Dolmas, Oded Galor, Greg Huffman, Toshihiro Ihori, Radhika Lahiri, Lionel McKenzie, Arundhati Sen, and the seminar participants at the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference in Ann Abor and at University of Rochester. The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial supports from the European Community Human Capital Mobility Program. 相似文献
12.
In Japan, some fishery cooperative associations use their fishery harbor names as a brand to differentiate their own shore fish. Most notable is the branding of mackerel. In this paper, we analyze the effects of branding using a discrete/continuous model. The results are as follows. First, there is first-mover advantage in the branding of mackerel. For instance, unlike other brands of mackerel, Seki-saba as the pioneering brand can increase its brand equity. Second, other brands have opposing effects that increase and decrease the brand equity of the pioneering brand. We find the former is strongest in the early stages of fishery branding when there are few competing brands of mackerel, while the latter becomes stronger in later stages when many other brands emerge. 相似文献
13.
Hideo Ishida 《人力资源管理》1986,25(1):103-120
14.
Summary This paper examines the conditions which guarantee that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the set of strong Nash equilibria in the normal form games withoutspillovers. We find thatpopulation monotonicity properties of the payoff functions, when the payoff of a player changes monotonically when the size of the group of players choosing the same strategy increases, are crucial to obtain the equivalence of these two solution concepts. We identify the classes of games, satisfying population monotonicity properties, which yield the equivalence of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of strong Nash equilibria. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equivalence result even when the population monotonicity assumptions are relaxed.We wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko, Akihiko Matsui, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Benyamin Shitoviz, Tayfun Sonmez, William Thomson, the participants of the Southeastern Economic Theory Meeting in Charlottesville and the seminars at CORE and University of Tsukuba for useful discussions and comments. Our special thanks due anonymous referee for the suggestion to add a section addressing the issue of existence of a strong Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
15.
Junichiro Ishida 《Review of Economic Design》2006,10(2):143-164
The paper presents a model where the probability of promotion tends to increase with seniority (overall labor market experience) without relying on the accumulation of general human capital. To this end, we consider the optimal design of a tournament (a relative compensation scheme) between two agents with different time horizon, the young and the old, in an overlapping generations framework. When the principal can only imperfectly monitor each agent’s effort level, the difference in time horizon leads to the ex post difference in the marginal value of effort between the two agents. In this case, the optimal tournament necessarily involves a bias towards the old agent. Within this framework, we also examine the relationship between: (1) the monitoring accuracy and the optimal bias; and (2) the value of outside options and the optimal bias. 相似文献
16.
Junichiro Ishida 《The Japanese Economic Review》2015,66(1):62-88
In most firms workers are divided asymmetrically in terms of authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view the asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchy and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that perspective. A key departure is that we consider a case where the authority relationship is defined only by the allocation of responsibility through contingent contracts. Within this framework, we show that the contractual arrangement that allocates responsibility asymmetrically often emerges as the optimal organizational form, which gives rise to the chain of command pertaining to hierarchical organizations. 相似文献
17.
We examine how Japanese listed companies increase the number of outside directors to comply with corporate governance reforms. We find that, after the reforms, there has been an increase in the number of cases in which former company auditors (kansayaku) become outside directors in the same company. This trend is more pronounced for hitherto noncompliant firms with insufficient outside directors before the reforms. Moreover, the firms appointing company auditors as outside directors tend to change their corporate structures to maintain existing practices and minimize compliance costs. Our findings imply that Japanese reforms have increased the unnatural selection of outside directors. 相似文献
18.
Kazufumi Fujimoto Hideo Nagai Wolfgang J. Runggaldier 《Asia-Pacific Financial Markets》2014,21(1):35-66
We consider the portfolio optimization problem for the criterion of maximization of expected terminal log-utility. The underlying market model is a regime-switching diffusion model where the regime is determined by an unobservable factor process forming a finite state Markov process. The main novelty is due to the fact that prices are observed and the portfolio is rebalanced only at random times corresponding to a Cox process where the intensity is driven by the unobserved Markovian factor process as well. This leads to a more realistic modeling for many practical situations, like in markets with liquidity restrictions; on the other hand it considerably complicates the problem to the point that traditional methodologies cannot be directly applied. The approach presented here is specific to the log-utility. For power utilities a different approach is presented in the companion paper (Fujimoto et al. in Appl Math Optim 67(1):33–72, 2013). 相似文献
19.
20.
Coalition formation as a dynamic process 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hideo Konishi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,110(1):1-41
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. In addition, we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium PCFs. 相似文献