Agency Contracts,Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)‐quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first‐best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden‐action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.     

SPATIAL PERFECT COMPETITION: A UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICING MODEL

Abstract.  Spatial competition is often probed in terms of spatial oligopoly and/or monopolistic competition in the literature. This paper considers spatial competition as a form of perfect competition, in the sense that the firms are assumed to be price-takers located at the centre of a market area and practising uniform pricing. It shows that under scale economy competitive equilibria can occur, and may actually be observed in the form of international price differentials. Both a very high price and a very low price can yield conditions of competitive equilibrium in spatially or otherwise separate markets.     

WHO BENEFITS FROM CORRODING KEIRETSU?

Abstract. Observations on Japan's industrial distribution system reveal that many producers maintain both keiretsu and non‐keiretsu channels. An intriguing question then is: what economic rationale underlies such an ambivalent policy? This motivated us to present a model of an incomplete keiretsu system. We find that the collapse of a keiretsu is not necessarily a misfortune for the firms remaining therein: they can turn the situation to their advantage if a keiretsu collapses partially. We show why some firms leave their keiretsu while others remain with it, and determine who the winners are.     

Price Effects of Target Ratcheting: A Progress Report on Medical Devices

Regulators, who have asymmetric information concerning the technology of regulated firms, often rely on incentive‐based regulation. While such a scheme is well known to be vulnerable to the adverse incentives of regulated firms, empirical research that quantifies the magnitude of distortion caused by incentive regulation is scarce. This paper is a progress report of our recent project on target ratcheting with an application to medical devices in Japan. A casual observation of detailed product‐level transaction data and reduced‐form analyses indicate the existence of pricing distortion in the wholesale market. The paper also proposes a two‐period bilateral bargaining model to match the data. A preliminary analysis finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that target ratcheting distorts the pricing of regulated firms, but the magnitude of the distortion is estimated to be economically small.     

On the relationship between the provision of waste management service and illegal dumping

The illegal dumping of waste has been a serious environmental concern of most countries in the world. This paper examines the relationship between the provision of waste treatment facilities and the frequency of illegal dumping. Our results show that a shortage of intermediate waste treatment facilities has played an important role in increasing the frequency of illegal dumping.     

Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.     

A two-region model with two types of manufacturing technologies and agglomeration

A two-region model is proposed in this paper. Manufactured goods can be produced with cottage technology under constant returns to scale or with modern technology using differentiated intermediate goods, which are produced with increasing returns to scale technology. In the model, there may be multiple equilibria, and, in such cases, the initial conditions determine the equilibrium that the economy reaches. It is shown that strong increasing returns due to specialization and low transportation costs bring about industrialization with agglomeration. This framework explains the mechanism behind the different industrialization process in Japan and in less developed countries.     

Productivity dispersion: facts,theory, and implications

This paper discusses the stylized facts, the theory, and the remaining problems of productivity dispersion, which is essentially related to the concept of equilibrium in the neoclassical theory. Empirical study of data relating to Japanese firms shows that they all obey the Pareto law, and also that the Pareto index decreases with the level of aggregation. In order to explain these two stylized facts we propose a theoretical framework built on the basic principle of statistical physics and on the concept of superstatistics, an approach that accommodates fluctuations of aggregate demand. We show that the allocation of production factors depends crucially on the level of aggregate demand, and that the higher the level of aggregate demand, the closer the economy is to the frontier of the production possibility set.     

Dynamic Free Trade Networks: Some Numerical Results

To help predict whether the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) continues until global free trade is effectively attained, this paper investigates dynamic paths of FTAs, generated by numerical simulations of a model of an FTA network formation game with many countries. The characteristics of the final FTA network naturally depend on how the proposer of an FTA is chosen in each period. The paper finds that if the country that has the largest incentive to form an FTA is chosen as a proposer in each period, the network evolution always leads to a unique final FTA network, which may or may not be the complete network of FTAs. FTA networks often evolve to a partition of the world into a small number of groups of asymmetric size owing to the negative network externality caused by preference erosion.     

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.