Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.     

An Interest Rate Model with Upper and Lower Bounds

We propose a new interest rate dynamicsmodel where the interest rates fluctuate in a bounded region. The model ischaracterised by five parameters which are sufficiently flexible to reflect theprediction of the future interest rates distribution. The interest rate convergesin law to a Beta distribution and has transition probabilities which arerepresented by a series of Jacobi polynomials. We derive the moment evaluationformula of the interest rate. We also derive the arbitrage free pure discountbond price formula by a weighted series of Jacobi polynomials. Furthermore wegive simple lower and upper bounds for the arbitrage free discount bond pricewhich are tight for the narrow interest rates region case. Finally we show thatthe numerical evaluation procedure converges to the exact value in the limitand evaluate the accuracy of the approximation formulas for the discount bondprices.     

Increasing marginal costs and satiation in the private provision of public goods: group size and optimality revisited

It is widely recognized that the degree of inefficiency in the voluntary provision of a public good increases with the group size of an economy. However, we find that only a slight modification in the conventional assumptions gives rise to a profound difference in outcome. In particular, we show that there is a case where the Nash equilibrium provision and the efficient provision will converge as the size of an economy grows. To show this, we assume individuals face increasing marginal cost of voluntary provision and their preference function has a finite satiety point.      

A note on the no arbitrage condition for international financial markets

We consider an international financial market model that consists ofN currencies. The purpose is to derive a no arbitrage condition which is not affected by the choice of numéraire between theN currencies. As a result, we show that a finiteness condition for an arbitrary chosen currency and the no arbitrage condition for the basket currency are necessary and sufficient for the no arbitrage property of all theN currencies. Research supported in part by Nomura Foundation for Social Science and by the European Community Stimulation Plan for Economic Science contract Number SPES-CT91-0089. The authors thank an anonymous FEJM referee for helpful comments.     

Which is better for durable goods producers,exclusive or open supply chain?

We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.     

Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer

The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported. Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998     

Location of industry, market size, and imperfect international capital mobility

This paper examines the impact of imperfect international capital mobility on an industrial location when increasing returns are present. When the international capital mobility is perfect, agglomeration of manufacturing firms progresses with a decline in transportation costs of manufactured goods, and full-agglomeration in a large-market country is observed at low transportation costs. In contrast, when international capital mobility is imperfect, agglomeration in a large-market country progresses with capital trade integration. When the transportation costs of manufactured goods are low, all capital holders in two countries invest their capital into a home market.     

Stock Prices and the Real Economy: Power Law versus Exponential Distributions

This paper explores the relationship between the stock prices and the real economy. The standard approach – the so called consumption-based asset pricing model – attempts to explain it based on the assumption of the representative agent. In this paper, we argue that the representative agent assumption is fundamentally flawed. Drawing on the recent advancement of “econophysics” on financial markets See Mantegna and Stanley (An Introduction to econophysics: correlations and complexity in finance, 2000) for the introduction to econophysics, we argue that in contrast to the neoclassical view, there is in fact a wedge between financial markets, the stock prices in particular, and the real economy.     

A two-region model with two types of manufacturing technologies and agglomeration

A two-region model is proposed in this paper. Manufactured goods can be produced with cottage technology under constant returns to scale or with modern technology using differentiated intermediate goods, which are produced with increasing returns to scale technology. In the model, there may be multiple equilibria, and, in such cases, the initial conditions determine the equilibrium that the economy reaches. It is shown that strong increasing returns due to specialization and low transportation costs bring about industrialization with agglomeration. This framework explains the mechanism behind the different industrialization process in Japan and in less developed countries.