Strategische Kommunikationsspiele

The main question of this paper is how actors in strategic communication constellations deal with seemingly hopeless situations. The thesis presented here is that actors in such situations make a strategic communication play. Basically, this facilitates the continuation of communication. The concept of strategic communication plays is developed theoretically in this paper. It is shown that strategic communication plays come across in direct interpersonal communication as well as in mass medial mediated communication. In the communication-sociological approach, it is used as the theoretical basis of a difference theory and paradoxical term of play based on Bateson (1956, 1985), embedded in the frame analysis of Goffmann (1980). On this basis, two functions of strategic communication plays are worked out. On the one hand, it is an extension of freedom of action and on the other hand increases the probability of sympathy and credibility attributions through self-thematization.     

Political pressures and the credibility of regulation: can profit sharing mitigate regulatory risk?

When price-cap rules determine the structure of prices for a long period, they suffer a credibility problem and introduce an element of risk especially if a firm’s profits are “too large”. Profit sharing may be seen as a device to pre-determine price adjustments and thus to decrease regulatory risk. We analyse the effects of profit sharing on the incentives to invest, using a real option approach. Absent credibility issues, a well designed profit sharing system may be neutral relative to a pure price cap. With regulatory risk, profit sharing is preferable to a pure price-cap one, if it intervenes for high enough profit levels.

The deregulation of international trucking in the European Union: form and effect

We describe the regulatory regime under which international trucking operated in Western Europe until the mid-1980s, the deregulatory process that followed, and the effect of this deregulation. We find that deregulation had a large positive effect on the growth of international trucking. We also find that shippers shifted toward more outsourcing of their trucking needs, but this occurred to an even greater extent in local and national road transport. We conclude that other factors beside the deregulation of international trucking affected the organization of the industry at the time. Finally, despite concerns voiced by member countries, we find no evidence that deregulation disproportionately favored carriers of countries that were initially more (or less) involved in international trucking, nor that it has favored low-wage countries.      

Monetary Policy in Austria–Hungary, 1876–1913: An Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Central Bank’s Discount Rate and the Liquidity Ratio

This paper presents a model to explain the official discount rate of the Central Bank of Austria–Hungary from 1876 to 1913. The discount rate is assumed to depend on the liquidity ratio of the Bank, defined as the ratio of its stock of metals to banknotes issued, and on changes in foreign discount rates. The paper also presents an equation explaining the liquidity ratio. We use “not equally spaced chronologically ordered data” referring to the 50 discount rate changes enacted. The regressions confirm that the liquidity ratio was the main determinant of the discount rate and that Germany (and not Great Britain) played a significant role in determining the Austro–Hungarian discount rate and the liquidity ratios, supporting the view that the classical gold standard was a decentralized multipolar system rather than a system fully dominated by London as suggested by Keynes. The regressions also suggest that, although Austria–Hungary had an inconvertible paper currency (1879–1892) and fluctuating exchange rates (1876–1895) and formally joined the gold standard only in 1902, it “shadowed” the behaviour of gold standard Central Banks with such consistency that the stability of the estimated regressions was relatively unaffected by the frequent institutional changes.