An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.      

Domestic concentration,foreign trade and economic performance

In a competitive fringe model the impact of concentration on price-cost margins can be shown to be ambiguous. Therefore, looking at the relationship between rates of return and concentration ratios is not sufficient for perceiving collusive elements. In this paper a model is set up that permits discerning collusion more clearly. Additional evidence concerning collusion can be gained by analyzing the influence of exports and imports on price-cost margins. Applying this approach to West Germany yields the result that the collusiveness prevailing in domestic markets has not visibly decreased in spite of a substantial increase in foreign trade.     

Book reviews

Journal of Consumer Policy -     

The Representation of Social Actors in Corporate Codes of Ethics. How Code Language Positions Internal Actors

This article understands codes of ethics as written documents that represent social actors in specific ways through the use of language. It presents an empirical study that investigated the codes of ethics of the German Dax30 companies. The study adopted a critical discourse analysis-approach in order to reveal how the code-texts produce a particular understanding of the various internal social groups for the readers. Language is regarded as social practice that functions at creating particular understandings of individuals and groups, how they are interrelated, and how they should behave. Findings show that codes of ethics do not represent employees as a group that is empowered or morally enlightened; instead they are positioned as passive receivers of rules and regulations. Furthermore, codes of ethics classify employees as having a need to be monitored and controlled by the higher levels of the corporate hierarchy. Overall, code language enforces compliance through maintaining existing and building new asymmetries between the different groups within a company. As a consequence, the article discusses a somewhat different understanding of code effectiveness. Reproducing and reemphasizing hierarchical relations could also lead to code compliance, perhaps without any need for developing the moral employee that is committed to ethical values.     

Country risk,portfolio decisions and regulation in international bank lending

This paper examines the concept of ‘country risk’ and relates it to the construction of efficient loan portfolios in international banking. Applicability of conventional portfolio-theoretic concepts to the management of country lending exposure is examined, as are the requisites of country review systems for national exposure management. The issue of international banking regulation is assessed in this context, focusing on the dangers inherent in national and international regulatory initiatives for optimum global capital allocation.     

The impact of different fibre access network technologies on cost,competition and welfare

Using a novel approach to the evaluation of new network technologies that combines an engineering cost model with a differentiated multi-player oligopoly model with wholesale access regulation this article evaluates the choice among different Fibre-to-the-Home (FTTH) architectures. The cost modelling relies upon an engineering bottom-up approach that feeds into a competition model. For addressing competition the pyramid model was chosen, which is an extension of the Hotelling model to multiple firms/services. The paper solves for price setting Nash equilibria between an incumbent, wholesale-access-based entrants and cable as an additional fully integrated network competitor. Welfare tradeoffs are highlighted with respect to cost differences and QoS differences between the various FTTH architectures and between the modes of regulation. According to the analysis architectures that can be unbundled (and that allow for greater speeds) outperform, from a social welfare perspective, architectures that (realistically) allow only for bitstream access.