Regulation, market structure and service trade liberalization

In this paper, we develop a theoretical method to quantify the importance of regulation and market structure on the success of service trade liberalization. For this purpose, we incorporate a single imperfectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures into a standard computational general equilibrium model. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia. We show that if the regulatory environment guarantees competition, Tunisia's welfare can improve up to 0.65%. If a cartel is formed between the domestic incumbent and foreign entrant, however, Tunisia's welfare can drop up to 0.25%. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing countries to step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom sector.     

FIRM COMPLIANCE WITH SOCIAL INSURANCE OBLIGATIONS WHERE THERE IS A WEAK SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SHANGHAI*

Abstract. This article examines why firms in Shanghai comply or over‐comply with social insurance obligations in a regulatory environment where the expected punishment for non‐compliance is low. Our first finding is that firms found to be in non‐compliance in the first audit in 2001 were moved into a separate violation category and the probability of being reaudited in 2002 was significantly higher if the firm was in that category. Our second main result is that, across the board, firms which were reaudited continued to underpay in 2002 but the extent of underpayment was significantly reduced.     

On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions for small developing countries

We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs.     

New Asian Regionalism: Evidence on the Impact Ofthe Asean +3 Free Trade Agreement on Its Member Countries

The emergence of new Asian regionalisms such as ASEAN+3 (10 ASEAN countries plus China, Korea and Japan) and other bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral free trade agreements in recent years requires research into these important developments and their underlying fundamental trade-growth causation. Popular existing methodologies such as the CGE/GTAP, gravity theory and panel regression (Dollar and Kraay, 2004) may be inappropriate due to their limited scope, heavily calibrated structure, cross-section data or non-simultaneity features (see also other criticisms in Productivity Commission Report, 2003). The paper extends the gravity theory to time-series data and applies a new flexible modelling approach to construct a simultaneous-equation model of trade and growth for the ASEAN and the East Asia 3. Using data from the World Bank national accounts and CHELEM regional and international trade over the period 1968–2000, the paper then estimates the model by both standard (OLS and 2SLS) and improved Stein-like (2SHI) estimation methods to provide superior MSE impact estimates. Implications of the findings for ASEAN+3’s economic integration, trade policy and prospects for trade and welfare improvement for this important regional FTA will also be discussed.

     

Employment,welfare and reserve effects of global protection

Summary In this article it is shown that expenditure-switching policies, like exchange rate protection, tariff protection and export subsidizing, might increase the level of employment and welfare in the short run (when indexation of factor prices is absent). Complete indexation of factor prices, however, makes exchange rate protection senseless. In the case of tariff protection, complete indexation will even worsen employment and welfare (protection becomes impoverishing). Only a policy of export subsidies makes sense if employment is to be improved in an indexed economy. This additional employment, however, is paid for with a deterioration of the terms of trade and the risk of retaliation. Therefore, taking the long run view, expenditure switching policies should be rejected for macro-economic purposes. The author is professor of international economics at Tilburg University. He would like to thank Dr. G. van Roij of the department of economics at Tilburg University and an unknown referee for their remarks, which led to an improvement of this article. The author is professor of international economics at Tilburg University. He would like to thank Dr. G. van Roij of the department of economics at Tilburg University and an unknown referee for their remarks, which led to an improvement of this article.     

Ceo Locus of Control and Small Firm Performance: an Integrative Framework and Empirical Test*

Previous research on the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) locus of control is mainly based on simple and partial mappings of bivariate associations between CEO locus of control and organizational outcomes. In addition, distinct substreams have emerged in which intricately related phenomena are studied separately. to overcome this fragmentation and polarization, we provide and empirically test an integrative framework based on previously tested hypotheses on the impact of CEO locus of control. Our approach differs from prior research in two ways. First, it simultaneously takes account of strategic choice and firm performance in order to assess the extent to which strategy mediates the relationship between CEO locus of control and organizational performance. Second, we consider the CEO to be both a formulator and implementor of organizational strategies. Besides the observation that CEO locus of control seems to matter a lot in terms of explaining organizational performance in the present sample, our results demonstrate that an integrative approach increases our insight into the impact of CEO locus of control by revealing why some CEOs achieve higher organizational performance than others.